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Executive summary  
 
The overall aims of this thematic study are to identify the strengths and weaknesses of existing systems 
of land tenure and land administration in South Africa, and to explore the implications of these 
strengths and weaknesses for the promotion of employment-intensive land reform.  
The study sets out to: 
• to describe and characterize the range of land tenure systems found in South Africa at present, 
with a particular focus on the security of tenure of those who have obtained access to land 
through land reform and those living in communal areas, where most smallholder farmers are 
located; 
• to describe the character of systems of land administration in South Africa at present and to 
assess their strengths and weaknesses, with a particular focus on rural areas; 
• to assess the degree to which the tenure reform programme undertaken since 1994 has been 
effective in securing the land rights of black South Africans; 
• to summarize and assess recent policy proposals for tenure reform and land administration 
emanating from the High Level Panel of Parliament and the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform; 
• to examine the implications of this assessment for a programme of land redistribution aimed at 
supporting smallholders and small-scale black commercial farmers and promoting employment-
intensiveness, with a focus on the institutional and capacity requirements. 
The study seeks to address seven interlinked research questions: 
1. Through what systems of land tenure do farmers in South Africa hold land rights, and what 
are the key features of these systems (with a particular focus on smallholder and small-scale 
black commercial farmers, including land reform beneficiaries)? 
The study reviews a wide range of tenure settings and sets out the diverse ways in which land tenure 
rights are determined and secured across the landscape.  
 
Farmers Numbers Key features Tenure regime 
Top 20% of large-scale 
commercial farmers on 
private land; almost all 
white 
7000 Sophisticated, specialised, 
capital intensive farmers, 
reducing the export of Agro 
processing and large 
retailers; produce bulk of 
produce perhaps as much 
as 80% 
Private land owned by 
individuals, companies 
and family trusts  
Medium to large-scale 
commercial farmers on 
private land; almost all 
white 
9000 some farmers succeed, 
some struggle, some are 
unable to turn a living from 
farming alone 
Small to medium scale 
commercial farmers on 
19,000 many cannot survive from 
farming alone; includes 
hobby farmers 
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Farmers Numbers Key features Tenure regime 
private land; mostly white, 
some black 
Small-scale black capitalist 
farmers in communal 
areas and in land reform 
context 
5000 to 10,000 Many farmers earn income 
from off farm incomes and 
businesses in addition to 
farming 
In communal areas 
and Act 9 reserves 
land rights held 
through a mix of 
historical quitrent and 
PTO certificates or 
leases issued by 
Ingonyama Trust  
Increasingly land 
occupation in former 
communal areas is 
undocumented 
In land reform 
contexts land access 
and use rights derive 
from membership of a 
CC, a CPA or as a 
beneficiary of a Trust. 
In urban areas 
livestock producers 
often graze informally 
and lack access to land 
Commonage users and 
people who have 
acquired land through 
PLAS notionally 
acquire rights through 
leasehold, although in 
many instances no 
leases are issued 
Market-oriented black 
smallholder farmers in 
communal areas and 
landform contexts 
supplying tight value 
chains (e.g. under 
contract) 
5000 to 10,000 Many grow fresh produce 
and irrigation, others are 
livestock producers, and a 
few engage in dryland 
cropping 
Market-oriented black 
smallholder farmers in 
communal areas and 
landform contexts and 
urban areas supplying 
loose value chains 
200,000 to 250,000 Many grow fresh produce 
and irrigation, and others 
are livestock producers. 




growing food for 
themselves, and selling 
occasionally 
2 to 2.5 million Most crop production takes 
place in Homestead 
Gardens, some of which are 
quite large. Occasional 
livestock sales by some 
 
The study notes that the land rights of at least 60% of the South African population remain off register, 
unrecorded and potentially insecure. These include the rights of between 17 and 18 million people living 
in former bantustan areas, together with workers and dwellers on farms and a wide range of urban 
residents in townships and informal settlements.  
The study also acknowledges that the rights of many people who have obtained access to land through 
the land reform programme also remain insecure for different reasons. In the former communal areas 
land rights have been protected by the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) which 
specifies that the land rights holders cannot be deprived of their rights to land without their consent. 
However, the recent promulgation of the Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Act is widely regarded as 
fundamentally eroding the limited protections provided by IPILRA and renders the rights of people living 
in communal areas vulnerable to land grabs and dispossession.  
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The study also highlights the failure of the state to adequately support landholding entities established 
to hold land on behalf of beneficiaries where groups of people have obtained land through different 
land reform sub programmes. With regard to current land redistribution policy, the state acquires and 
retains ownership of land and leases it to selected beneficiaries. However, evidence suggests that many 
people on this land either do not have leases, or their leases have expired. There are also indications 
that the determination of rental calculations are inconsistent, creating a number of anomalies and 
challenges for the lessees. 
2. How secure are these land rights, in both law and in practice, and in what ways do different 
tenure systems either support or constrain farmers in their agricultural production? 
The relative insecurity of land rights varies from substantially from setting to setting. Even though legal 
protection may be thin in many former communal areas, living customary law and associated social 
norms generally make it difficult for people to be dispossessed. That said, there are also numerous 
circumstances where powerful figures have run roughshod over custom and practice and entered into 
land deals which dispossess or marginalise rural people and exclude them from resource benefits. In 
large areas under the control of the Ingonyama Trust, rural citizens are being reduced to tenancy on 
land which they have occupied for generations. Rural land rights are shown to be particularly vulnerable 
where mining deals are planned. The breakdown in land administration is also thought to be one of the 
contributory factors to the decline of crop farming on arable land in former bantustan areas. 
3. How is land administered in the rural areas of South Africa at present, in pursuit of what kinds 
of objectives? Are these objectives relevant for smallholder and small-scale black commercial 
farmers? Are current land administration systems effective in supporting land rights holders, 
as well as wider developmental processes, and if not, why not? 
It is widely acknowledged that in large parts of the country land administration has collapsed. This is 
particularly true in the former bantustan areas where old systems of permits granting permission to 
occupy permits not been replaced by any other form of recorded right. The failure of the Department of 
Land Affairs and its successor the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to meet their 
constitutional obligations and pass legislation to ensure security of tenure has rendered many rural 
citizens vulnerable. 
 In the main, formal land use planning and control in many former bantustans has been abandoned, 
opening the space for localised informal land allocation and resource capture. On the 10 million ha of 
land acquired through the land reform programme, the land rights of beneficiary households remain 
opaque. Although the outer boundary of the land is recorded and the property is held by either a 
Communal Property Association or a Trust (in the case of Restitution and the early forms of land 
redistribution) the rights of individual members to use the land and the confidence to make investment 
remain largely unspecified and unsupported. 
The leasehold system which underpins PLAS remains poorly supported and administered. This allows 
officials to manipulate land allocations, cancel leases and displace lessees with other more favoured 
individuals. The lack of clarity and transparency in the system has opened the door to elite capture and 
facilitated asset stripping on properties acquired by the state. 
4. What are the key strengths and weaknesses of current systems of land tenure and land 
administration in South Africa, from the perspective of smallholder and small-scale black 
commercial farmers? 
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Poorly supported land holding entities and the failure to invest in the development of local land rights 
management systems has prevented optimal utilisation of land acquired through land reform. The 
reluctance to subdivide land has privileged joint ventures with ‘strategic partners’ – many of whom end 
up by being the primary beneficiaries of land reform as currently practiced. The critical functions of land 
administration have been overlooked and frequently conflated with tenure security. These combine  
• juridical functions to allocate and adjudicate rights to land, delimit and register land parcels 
• regulatory functions to determine land use controls  
• fiscal functions related to rates, taxes and revenue collection  
• enforcement functions to ensure that land users to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities 
and abide by relevant regulations. 
While many smallholders may benefit from improved tenure security their livelihoods may depend on 
malleable systems of land administration, while systems that seek to collect revenue and enforce 
regulations may be inimical to smallholder survival. 
5. What new directions for tenure reform have been proposed over the past two years by the High 
Level Panel of Parliament and the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform, and how useful 
and relevant are these for smallholder and small-scale black commercial farmers? 
The main recommendations relating to land tenure can be divided into two parts – those that focus on 
the rights of people living in the former bantustans, and those that focus on farm workers, dwellers and 
labour tenants. The HLP recommended that: 
• The Communal Land Tenure Bill should be rejected; 
• IPILRA should be respected and enforced by the DRDLR, by mining companies and traditional 
leaders. It should be amended and made permanent; 
• Laws that have been interpreted to aid land grabs (the Traditional leadership and Governance 
Framework Act (TLGFA), the Minerals and Petroleum Development Act (MPRDA) and the 
Ingonyama Trust Act (ITA) need to be made explicitly subject to IPILRA; 
o The Ingonyama Trust Act should be repealed (or at least substantially amended) to bring 
KZN in line with national land policy, and secure land tenure for communities and 
residents concerned. 
• A system of land records should be established that takes into account existing nested or 
relative rights. 
HLP recommendations for farm workers and labour tenants were that: 
• The ESTA Amendment Bill should be amended.  
• The LTA should be amended to ensure that restitution claims are not prioritised over labour 
tenant claims; 
• ESTA and LTA need to be properly enforced;  
• A National Register of evictions should be set up, to record the off-register rights of those still 
living on farms.  
• DRDLR must prepare a comprehensive, properly costed and funded implementation plan for 
the LTA; 
o Parliament should carefully monitor the DRDLR’s progress on implementing the 
LTA. 




A key recommendation in the HLP report is the enactment of a general Land Reform Framework Act and 
a Land Records Act. The HLP report considers the enactment of a Land Records Act as a vital element in 
providing the necessary institutional power to give effect the rights-based tenure laws.  
The Expert Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (2019) identifies tenure insecurity as a key 
factor exacerbating overall inequalities in land and contributing to the economic exclusion of the 
majority of South Africans with a particular focus on women and youth. The report proposes support for 
a mixed tenure model which accommodates a continuum of land rights from freehold and communal 
and which enables multilevel ownership arrangements.  
The panel proposes a dedicated focus on land administration which it argues should be the fourth pillar 
of land reform. It recommends a separate tenure reform budget line be created, as already exists for 
restitution, so that support for land rights recordal, registration and administration is ring-fenced (Expert 
Advisory Panel: 87). 
The panel calls on the President to assent to the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 64 of 1998 and sign 
it into law forthwith. “Further, the President should explicitly call on all organs of state to work together 
to expedite subdivisions of agricultural and non-agricultural land to make available smallholdings for 
poor people, for residential, business and productive processes. Subdivision of large holdings, for the 
purposes of land reform, is essential if it is to benefit the poor and contribute to a less concentrate and 
unequal pattern of landholding” (Ibid: 95). 
6. What are the institutional and capacity requirements of effective tenure reform and land 
administration, with a particular focus on smallholder and small-scale black commercial 
farmers? 
A series of legislative changes were introduced during the 1990s, using both approaches separately or 
combined. Moves to deracialise land law predated the transition to democratic government in 1994. 
Three decades later we see that the hierarchy of rights has endured, though in a less racialised form. 
Although the rights outside of the formal system are no longer determined by race, they do coincide to 
some degree with racial identities and norms, and to a large extent, poverty. The system of registration 
still defines formal property rights and no serious attempt has been made to record the majority of off-
register rights that are managed according to a range of social norms. More recognition and support 
need to be given to systems that are best understood as ‘social tenures’ which are socially regulated by 
local norms rather than statutory rules.  
Such rights are managed, usually locally or in families, according to norms and practices that differ from 
the regulatory framework of the Deeds Registry. Social tenures also recognise that different members of 
a community have access rights to various resources, the boundaries of which may change seasonally or 
to accommodate additional members.  
These more flexible social and spatial relationships governing access to, and authority over land are 
odds with the Deeds registry rules that require clearly and accurately defined social and spatial units 
arranged in a one-to-one relationship. To change either of the two systems would be so fundamental as 
to change their very nature. Evidence has revealed that embedded social practices continue even after 
titles are issued, which renders the details on the title deeds inaccurate. The match between the 
information on the title deed and rights recognised on the ground widens further with the passage of 
time (Kingwill 2014 a, b, 2017). 
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South Africa has to invest in flexible land administration institutions and systems which are rooted in 
legal and normative pluralism and which can accommodate diverse systems of rights management. 
Currently there are no state institutions to record, administer, regulate, value and enforce rights, nor 
solve disputes and conflicts that arise across the landscape. These impact on smallholder producers who 
lack systemic support to clarify rights and facilitate transactions enabling secure access to land and 
resolve disputes.  Currently the only way to settle land disputes and clarify rights is to approach the 
courts on the basis of Roman Dutch law. There are traditional courts ostensibly employing customary 
law, but these are rejected by many as authoritarian and gender unresponsive.  
7. In designing an employment-intensive programme of land redistribution, what land tenure 
options should be offered to different types of beneficiary? What systems of land 
administration are required to oversee or support these tenure options, and how would 
current land administration systems need to be reconfigured to align with this objective? 
The report highlights that in South African setting we need to distinguish between:  
• land registration agendas as part of a narrow agenda to promote individual titling; 
• land recordal and administration systems which form part of a broader socioeconomic rights 
initiative to:  
o secure and make transparent existing rights in land,  
o enable family tenure,  
o and assist vulnerable rightsholders whose property is off-register to protect their 
livelihood assets against arbitrary dispossession.  
The table below proposes what needs to change to create tenure and land administration regimes which 
assist in securing accesses and registrable rights in land backed by systems of land administration which 
could contribute to developing an enabling environment for smallholder production in different settings. 
 
Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
Former bantustans Adopt the HLP recommendations to pass 
the Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 
to  
recognise beneficial occupation of land 
protect informal rights to land which are 
often shared and overlapping and 
governed by living customary law  
ensure that no person’s informal right to 
occupy land may be deprived without 
their consent 
protect those whose rights are off register 
and vulnerable paying particular attention 
to the land rights of women 
enable compensation for those deprived 
of informal rights in land 
 
Train and resource independent 
facilitators to conduct land rights 
enquiries and facilitate democratic 
decision making  
Provide a public data base of all 
certificates of consent enabling 
deprivation of land rights approved in 
terms of PILRA to provide oversight over 
land deals 
Identify all the remaining paper-based 
PTO and quitrent land records in the 
former homelands, collate and digitise 
Rethink basic requirements for cadastral 
information and rights  
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Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
Ingonyama Trust Implement HLP and PAP 
recommendations to fundamentally 
amend or repeal ITA 
Protect the rights of people living on land 
administered by ITA against arbitrary 
deprivation and conversion to leasehold 
with a particular focus on the rights of 
women 
Refund lease payments levied by ITA  
recordal in different settings across the 
continuum of land rights with special 
attention to communal tenure settings 
Pilot low cost, ‘good enough’ options to 
repurpose the cadastral and land records 
system to enable adequate description 
and registration of land rights in different 
settings across the continuum of land 
rights. 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
Develop institutional options for land 
rights recordal linked to spatial 
development planning and revenue 
collection at local municipal and district 
scales 
Specify the role and functions of 
traditional councils and land holding 
entities in local land administration, 
allocate budget and support capacity for 
this function 
Develop checks and balances that prevent 
corrupt and improper transactions in the 
land registry and dispossession of 
vulnerable rights holders 
Act 9/TRANCRAA 
Rural Areas 
Implement HLP and PAP 
recommendations to revitalise TRANCRAA 
process 
Clarify land rights and resolve disputes  
Clarify and support role of local 
municipality or communal property 
Association holding TRANCRAA land in the 
process of land rights recordal, 





Clarify and support role of local 
municipality or landholding entity holding 
restored land in the process of land rights 
recordal, management of local registers 
and rights transfers 
Develop and update registers of members 
and clarify individual rights in land – 
(residential sites, business sites in 
established settlements, grazing and 
arable rights. 
Clarify entry and exit procedures for 
membership 
Clarify member eligibility for a share of 
benefits from business enterprises that 
may be operated from the property 
Clarify member’s responsibilities to 
contribute to a pro rata portion of the 
property rates levied on the land, 
Pilot low cost, ‘good enough’ options to 
repurpose the cadastral and land records 
system to enable adequate description 
and registration of land rights in different 
settings across the continuum of land 
rights. 
Develop processes and procedures for 
internal subdivision and the allocation of 
rights on subdivided land 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
Budget for, develop capacity and provide 
support for land rights administration by 
CPAs including an updated register of 
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Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
together with other membership and 
service fees 
Clarify the liability of members for debts 
which may be incurred by the Association 
members and the allocation of land use 
rights 
 
Land transferred to 




Commission a research to review the 
status and sustainability of properties 
transferred through SLAG 
Agree responsibilities, procedures and 
assign capacity to wind up/liquidate failed 
projects and deregister defunct legal 
entities  
Develop procedures for subdivision of 
land and reallocation of rights on an 
ownership or leasehold basis  
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes 
Include areas targeted for the creation of 
smallholdings within municipal spatial 
development frameworks 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 




Commission a research to review the 
status and sustainability of properties 
transferred through LRAD.  
Document and share lessons for land 
reform and land tenure  
Agree responsibilities, procedures and 
assign capacity to wind up/liquidate failed 
projects and deregister defunct legal 
entities where required 
Develop procedures for subdivision of 
land and reallocation of rights on an 
ownership or leasehold basis as may be 
appropriate 
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes where appropriate 
Consider Act to enable retrospective 
endorsement of the title deeds of all land 
purchased through the land reform 
programme to give the state the right of 
first refusal to purchase land which comes 




Review the status quo with leases on 2200 
farms purchased through this programme  
Revisit the State Land lease and Disposal 
Policy to review lease terms and options 
to own state land acquired through PLAS.  
Develop clear criteria for the allocation of 
farms in terms of this programme 
consistent with the principles in the 
proposed Land Reform Framework Act 
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes 
Include areas targeted for the creation of 
smallholdings within municipal spatial 
development frameworks 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
Farm workers and 
dwellers 
Develop a clear policy framework to guide 
the implementation of section 4 of ESTA 
Review and revise existing policy on 
farmworker housing and assess the 
appropriateness of the Operation Phakisa 
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Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
Incentivise policy options which give 
access to land to farm workers and 
dwellers for cultivation and grazing by 
agreement with the landowner. 
Review policy for on and off-site 
settlement and make available tenure 
grants and dwellers to acquire land for 
housing and small-scale production 
Analyse the feasibility of delivering 
services to off-site settlements and the 
danger of creating rural poverty traps 
proposals on the creation of ‘smart’ 
agrivillages. 
Develop policy and feasibility criteria for 
the establishment of rural agrivillages and 
hamlets. 
Labour tenants Appoint a Special Master 
Reconstruct the register of labour tenant 
claims 
Process claims 
Create clear guidelines for consultation 
around tenure arrangements on restored 
land and potential for subdivision of 
properties between different labour 
tenant families with pre-existing rights to 
the land 
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes 
Include areas targeted for the creation of 
smallholdings within municipal spatial 
development frameworks 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
Commonage users Review the status quo with management 
and leases on municipal commonage 
purchased through this programme  
Revisit the commonage policy to review 
lease terms and the determination of user 
fees and responsibilities  
Develop clear criteria for the allocation of 
commonage use rights consistent with the 
principles in the proposed Land Reform 
Framework Act 
Develop a register of municipal 
commonage land held by local and district 
municipalities 
  
Clearly it will require much more than security of tenure to reinvigorate land-based livelihoods in South 
Africa. While secure land rights provide an essential foundation for economic and livelihood 
opportunities, such rights also confer obligations. They make land rights holders visible to the state and 
to the payment of rates and taxes. In ‘grouphold’ contexts created by land reform recorded rights for 
households and individuals will come with responsibilities to contribute to the maintenance and upkeep 
of common property and shared infrastructure. The increase in overhead costs and related obligations 
associated with recorded and legally secure rights risks being unpalatable to poor and marginal 
households who may perceive an imbalance between costs and benefits and who would prefer 
accordingly to manage the risks and exploit the opportunities associated with informality and continued 
invisibility to the state. It will be crucial therefore to find a favourable balance between costs, 
responsibilities and tangible enhancement of opportunities and benefits. 
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“What people do with land is very complex, and not at all obvious. Let us not be too quick to suppose 
that we understand what is going on”.1  
1 Background 
The CBPEP/GTAC Project: Employment intensive land reform in South Africa: policies, programmes and 
capacities aims to formulate a set of options for rural land reform in South Africa aimed at generating a 
large number of employment, self-employment and livelihood-enhancing opportunities through the 
promotion of small-scale agriculture. The anticipated project outputs include:  
• formulating national policy guidelines on the promotion of employment intensive agriculture;  
• designing programmes for implementation by national and provincial departments in 
conjunction with non-governmental partners; 
• costing such programmes;  
• conceptualizing the provision of relevant support services for those acquiring access to land in 
different settings, including provision of extension advice and support for marketing of produce.  
 
1.1 Aims and objectives of this study 
The overall aims of this thematic study are to identify the strengths and weaknesses of existing systems 
of land tenure and land administration in South Africa, and to explore the implications of these 
strengths and weaknesses for the promotion of employment-intensive land reform.  
The specific objectives of the study are: 
• to describe and characterize the range of land tenure systems found in South Africa at present, 
with a particular focus on the security of tenure of those who have obtained access to land 
through land reform and those living in communal areas, where most smallholder farmers are 
located; 
• to describe the character of systems of land administration in South Africa at present and to 
assess their strengths and weaknesses, with a particular focus on rural areas; 
• to assess the degree to which the tenure reform programme undertaken since 1994 has been 
effective in securing the land rights of black South Africans; 
• to summarize and assess recent policy proposals for tenure reform and land administration 
emanating from the High Level Panel of Parliament and the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform; 
• to examine the implications of this assessment for a programme of land redistribution aimed at 
supporting smallholders and small-scale black commercial farmers and promoting employment-
intensiveness, with a focus on the institutional and capacity requirements. 
1.2 Research questions 
The study seeks to address seven interlinked research questions: 
 
1 Ferguson, J. (2012). "How to Do Things with Land: A Distributive Perspective on Rural Livelihoods in Southern Africa." Journal 
of Agrarian Change 13(1): 166-174. 
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1. Through what systems of land tenure do farmers in South Africa hold land rights, and what are 
the key features of these systems (with a particular focus on smallholder and small-scale black 
commercial farmers, including land reform beneficiaries)? 
2. How secure are these land rights, in both law and in practice, and in what ways do different 
tenure systems either support or constrain farmers in their agricultural production? 
3. How is land administered in the rural areas of South Africa at present, in pursuit of what kinds of 
objectives? Are these objectives relevant for smallholder and small-scale black commercial 
farmers? Are current land administration systems effective in supporting land rights holders, as 
well as wider developmental processes, and if not, why not? 
4. What are the key strengths and weaknesses of current systems of land tenure and land 
administration in South Africa, from the perspective of smallholder and small-scale black 
commercial farmers? 
5. What new directions for tenure reform have been proposed over the past two years by the High 
Level Panel of Parliament and the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform, and how useful 
and relevant are these for smallholder and small-scale black commercial farmers? 
6. What are the institutional and capacity requirements of effective tenure reform and land 
administration, with a particular focus on smallholder and small-scale black commercial 
farmers? 
7. In designing an employment-intensive programme of land redistribution, what land tenure 
options should be offered to different types of beneficiary? What systems of land administration 
are required to oversee or support these tenure options, and how would current land 
administration systems need to be reconfigured to align with this objective? 
2 Key terms and concepts 
This study hinges on the need for a clear understanding of the distinction between land tenure and land 
administration and the ways in which tenure (in)security and the presence/absence of coherent, 
affordable, citizen friendly, open systems of land administration either: 
• enhance/undermine opportunities for employment intensive land reform  
• enable/disable the emergence of dynamic systems of land-based production and distribution 
which enlarge livelihood opportunities and the social and economic well-being of poor 
households. 
Manona et al (2018) reflect on the distinction between tenure and land administration. 
2.1 Land tenure 
Land tenure systems delineate how land is held, by whom and with what rights. They determine who 
can be on the land and the terms of their access, occupation and use. Tenure rights are mediated by 
nested social relationships customary law and statutes which clarify and limit individual and group rights 
and specify obligations. These set the terms through which individuals, groups or corporations hold and 
use land. 
These terms can be analysed in terms of the breadth, duration and assurance of the rights in question.  
• Breadth refers to the extent of the bundle of rights held in land, including the right to forbid 
others from exercising particular rights. 
• Duration is the length of time that a given land right is legally valid - this has implications for 
short versus long term capital investments. 
• Assurance implies that the rights have legal certainty for a specified duration.  
       
12 
 
The combination of these factors secures the land rights holder’s entitlement to reap the benefits of 
labour or capital invested in the land 
The rights associated with land tenure include: 
• Use rights — the rights of a holder to utilise the land. 
• Transfer rights — the rights of a holder to transfer their rights to someone else by means of 
sale, mortgage, leasing, renting or inheritance. 
• Exclusion rights — the rights of a holder to exclude others from claiming use, access or transfer 
rights. 
• Enforcement rights — legal, institutional and administrative provisions which guarantee and 
protect rights. (Feder and Feeny 1991) 
2.2 Land Administration 
Barry (1999) observes that land administration combines a number of operational systems, including: 
• land registration system(s),  
• cadastral surveying and mapping,  
• land valuation and taxation regimes,  
• building regulation administration,  
• subdivision application and land development administration,  
• land dispute and conflict adjudication.  
 
Land administration is usually broken down into juridical, regulatory, fiscal and enforcement functions:  
• The juridical function entails allocation of rights to land, delimitation of parcels, adjudication 
and registration (recording of rights). 
• The regulatory functions comprise land use controls (all regulations). 
• The fiscal functions are used to meet a range of economic and social objectives (e.g. revenue 
collection). 
• The enforcement functions enforce users to fulfil their responsibilities and abide by relevant 
regulations. 
As is detailed further below the recent report of the Presidential Advisory Panel has recommended that 
land administration be regarded as the fourth pillar/leg of land reform. This will require recognition of 
land administration systems as “a critical public good infrastructure” enabling implementation of “land 
policies in support of sustainable development and include institutional arrangements, legal 
frameworks, processes, standards, land information management and dissemination systems, and 
technologies required to support allocation, land markets, valuation, control of use, and development of 
interests in land”(Bennett, Tambuwala et al. 2013: 85). 
2.3 Land tenure by numbers 
According to Hornby et al. (2017) just under 60% of South African citizens hold land rights which are 
unrecognised by the formal property system. The table below provides an estimation the spatial settings 
where people’s land rights are unrecorded and potentially vulnerable as there is no functioning land 
information management system designed give visibility to rights which are off-register. 
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Table 1: Off register rightsholders in different spatial settings across South Africa 
Location/Category No of people % of SA Population 
Communal areas 17 million 32.8% 
Farm workers and dwellers 2 million 3.9% 
Informal Settlements 3.3 million 6.3% 
Backyard shacks 1.9 million 3.8% 
Inner City Buildings 200 000 0.38% 
Low Income Housing (RDP Houses) – no titles 5 million 9.6% 
Low Income Housing with titles 1.5 million 3% 
Total 30.72 59.7% 
 
A large number of smallholder farmers and small-scale producers are to be found within the former 
bantustans and contemporary communal areas where land rights are increasingly uncertain. The recent 
signing of the Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill into law serves to erode the limited protections 
provided to rights holders in this context by the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act. Although 
land reform projects do not feature in the list above, there is a strong argument that they should be 
included, as land in the earlier phases of land redistribution (SLAG and LRAD) and restitution is held by 
landholding entities such as Communal Property Associations and Trusts. However, these arrangements 
have often left the rights of individual members are undescribed and insecure. Likewise, lease 
arrangements entered into with the state for land acquired under the Proactive Land Acquisition 
Strategy (PLAS) remain insecure to arbitrary state action and administrative failure. With the inclusion of 
households acquiring land through land reform the percentage of the population with insecure or off 
register land rights rises to in excess of 60%. 
3 Key features of smallholder tenure and land administration systems in different settings 
In this section we examine how different tenure and land administration arrangements form part of a 
much wider array of forces which impact on smallholder and small scale black commercial producers in 
different spatial and agro-ecological settings, past and the present.  
This, as Hay suggests, requires a “systematic investigation of the history of land, settlement, community 
and agriculture in a particular area over a long period of time, to show in depth how history relates to 
land reform policy” (Hay 2015: 17). This points to the need for an analytical framing that can span a wide 
range of contexts and which can provide a longitudinal perspective on how tenure (together with a 
range of other factors) influences local production activities. 
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3.1 Small-scale producers  
in 2009 it was calculated that there were 2, 6 million black farming households based on statistics 
derived from South Africa’s Labour Force Survey and the General Household Survey produced by 
Statistics South Africa (Aliber and Hall 2012). It has been estimated that there are some 200,000 
households – approximately 1 million people who can be classified as small-scale market-oriented 
producers. Cousins (2015: 6) argues that to date existing land reform and agricultural support 
programmes have been “strongly biased in favour of emerging black commercial farmers operating at 
medium or large-scale, despite rhetoric that asserts the importance of supporting smallholders”. He 
estimates that between 5000 and 10,000 black farmers have entered the commercial farming sector 
while between 100 and 250,000 rural households may have gained access to land at some point through 
different arms of the land reform programme.  
However in a recent review it was estimated that there has been a high rate of attrition and that many 
households listed as beneficiaries of land reform no longer exercise their rights in this land (Aliber 2018). 
Overall around 250,000 small-scale black farmers sell farm produce primarily through informal 
marketing channels. In addition, there are around million rural households which owned some livestock. 
However, livestock holdings are deeply stratified with a minority of households owning majority of 
stock. 
Cousins provides a breakdown of the agrarian structure in South Africa in 2014. 
Table 2: A breakdown of South Africa's agrarian structure 
Farmers Numbers Key features Tenure regime 
Top 20% of large-scale 
commercial farmers on 
private land; almost all 
white 
7000 Sophisticated, specialised, 
capital intensive farmers, 
reducing the export of Agro 
processing and large 
retailers; produce bulk of 
produce perhaps as much 
as 80% 
Private land owned by 
individuals, companies 
and family trusts  
Medium to large-scale 
commercial farmers on 
private land; almost all 
white 
9000 some farmers succeed, 
some struggle, some are 
unable to turn a living from 
farming alone 
Small to medium scale 
commercial farmers on 
private land; mostly white, 
some black 
19,000 many cannot survive from 
farming alone; includes 
hobby farmers 
Small-scale black capitalist 
farmers in communal 
areas and in land reform 
context 
5000 to 10,000 Many farmers earn income 
from off farm incomes and 
businesses in addition to 
farming 
In communal areas 
and Act 9 reserves 
land rights held 
through a mix of 
historical quitrent and 
PTO certificates or 
leases issued by 
Ingonyama Trust  
Market-oriented black 
smallholder farmers in 
communal areas and 
landform contexts 
supplying tight value 
5000 to 10,000 Many grow fresh produce 
and irrigation, others are 
livestock producers, and a 
few engage in dryland 
cropping 
       
15 
 
Farmers Numbers Key features Tenure regime 
chains (e.g. under 
contract) 
Increasingly land 
occupation in former 
communal areas is 
undocumented 
In land reform 
contexts land access 
and use rights derive 
from membership of a 
CC, a CPA or as a 
beneficiary of a Trust. 
In urban areas 
livestock producers 
often graze informally 
and lack access to land 
Commonage users and 
people who have 
acquired land through 
PLAS notionally 
acquire rights through 
leasehold, although in 
many instances no 
leases are issued 
Market-oriented black 
smallholder farmers in 
communal areas and 
landform contexts and 
urban areas supplying 
loose value chains 
200,000 to 250,000 Many grow fresh produce 
and irrigation, and others 
are livestock producers. 




growing food for 
themselves, and selling 
occasionally 
2 to 2.5 million Most crop production takes 
place in Homestead 
Gardens, some of which are 
quite large. Occasional 
livestock sales by some 
Adapted from (Cousins 2015) based on Statistics South Africa’s agricultural censuses of 2002 and 2007; (Vink and Van Rooyen 
2009) (Aliber, Maluleke et al. 2013) 
As can be seen from the table above producers operate in widely differing tenure settings. However, the 
estimates are silent on the gender breakdown of the land rights holders in the different settings 
described above. The vast majority of white commercial and black capitalist farmers own the land on 
which they farm. Tenure arrangements in land reform contexts will vary widely with the land being held 
by communal property institutions (CPAs and Trusts), or being leased from the state.  
As will be explored in depth below tenure arrangements may vary widely across the different communal 
area settings. In some instances, such as land administered by the Ingonyama trust in KwaZulu-Natal 
land rights holders have been turned into tenants, whereas in other settings social tenures backed by 
living customary law may provide secure tenure, even if these rights may be poorly protected by statute. 
3.2 Communal land tenure in former bantustans 
As Cousins (2007) has noted, the term ‘communal tenure’ incorporates a wide range of land use and 
occupation arrangements. The land areas designated in the schedule to the 1913 Land Act represented 
those with long histories of unbroken occupation. Much of the land in the former reserves and 
bantustans is owned by the South African Development Trust (SADT) established in terms of the Native 
Trust and Land Act of 1936.  
This land is held under ‘communal tenure’ - a contested concept and a much-misunderstood property 
rights regime which has been significantly distorted by colonial administrators: 
“These distortions were, in part, intentional endeavours by colonial powers to retain 
and codify versions of communal tenure that would best suit their interests. One of 
the main misconceptions espoused by colonial administrators was that common 
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tenure (sic) described a wholly collective system of land ownership that was void of 
notions of individual interest. (Clark and Luwaya 2017: 5)  
These distortions have long been recognised elsewhere in Southern Africa.  
The recent writings of anthropologists and historians have emphasized the ways in 
which the perspectives, concepts and meanings attached to African forms of land 
tenure arise as much from the framework of colonial history and the forms of 
evidence this produced, as from the nature of land holding itself. (Whitehead and 
Tsikata 2003: 69) 
Under the colonial administration, the multiple types of authority and sets of claims 
over land and its products were glossed as communal tenure, which became 
incorporated into the developing body of customary law… ‘‘communal” tenure was 
profoundly shaped—though not determined—by the colonial situation, often serving 
state, private European, and elite African interests. (Peters 2009: 1317) 
 
In the apartheid era land in the reserves and emergent bantustans was administered by increasingly 
authoritarian tribal authorities, hereditary chiefs and appointed headman who received salaries from 
the state (Ntsebeza 2003). Legislation such as the Native Administration Act of 1927, the Black 
Administration Act and the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 served to consolidate the powers of chiefs and 
transform them into state functionaries with powers over traditional courts, tribal levies and land 
allocation. 
Colonial and apartheid officials sought to elevate the powers of traditional leaders regarding decision-
making over land rights. They sought to simplify and codify land rights allocation and management 
systems, which in practice were nuanced and layered with significant local variations. 
The colonial and apartheid states also ignored and undermined communal tenure 
practices that emphasised exclusive use by individuals or families. 
(Clark and Luwaya 2017: 6) 
However, as state bureaucrats set out to purchase land to enlarge the reserves, this was managed 
within tightly regulated allocation system through the issue of Permission to Occupy (PTO) certificates. 
PTOs were often allocated within frameworks of land use planning and administration shaped by 
‘betterment’ planning schemes. Betterment itself triggered forced removals within reserves and 
bantustans, where families were moved into ‘planned’ villagers with demarcated residential plots and 
garden sites, allocations of arable land and access to communal grazing camps. Officials sought to 
regulate the number of livestock on these camps through grazing controls and forced destocking 
measures (Scogings, de Bruyn et al. 1999).  
Ostensibly betterment was promoted to counter environmental degradation resulting from the 
concentration of increasing numbers of people on very small areas of land. 
Far from conserving the environment, developing agriculture and improving the 
quality of life in rural areas, betterment has had the opposite effect. A number of 
writers have argued, in fact, that the real motives underlying its implementation had 
nothing to do with environmental conservation and agricultural development, but 
more to do with ensuring a steady supply of migrant workers to the mines and 
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industries of white South Africa and, later, with control of the rural population. 
(McAllister 1991 :116) 
The legacies of betterment planning resulted in deep suspicion of state intervention regarding land-use 
management controls, as these have almost always eroded livelihoods and constrained access to land in 
the past. It can be argued this mistrust of state planning and land use schema persists today.  
As noted above, tenure arrangements in the former bantustan areas are by no means uniform. In the 
Cape Province, colonial authorities encouraged individualization of land rights – something that was not 
pursued in Natal. In the Cape, the Native Locations and Commonage Act of 1879 enabled the creation of 
individual quitrent titles which coexisted with land reserved for communal grazing (Cousins and 
Claassens 2008).  This approach was further elaborated through the Glen Grey Act, promulgated in 
1894, which also sought to introduce a system of individual tenure based on a principle of “one man one 
lot” and the payment of quitrent. This policy has been characterized as:  
“a deliberate and conscious attempt… to restrict rights which people had to land. 
Under the Glen Grey system, it was only the titleholder who was to have any rights to 
the land and… these rights were to be legally entrenched. The people were only going 
to be allowed to cultivate the land if it were registered in their names. By means of 
this measure any rights which the extended family might have had to were effectively 
eliminated”. (Ally 1985: 208-209) 
However, the Glen Grey policy was quickly subverted by non-compliance. People who had been 
allocated land through the system did not follow officially designated procedures. They simply allocated 
land to their heirs, or to other land users by informal agreement. The new land users failed to apply to 
transfer the plot into their name and rather continued to pay the quitrent fees using the name of the 
original registered holder. Magistrate’s reports frequently recorded “improper occupation of land” and 
instances where “vacant or surveyed lands are being cultivated by individuals who have no right or claim 
to them.” (Ibid, 1985) 
In 1910 the chief magistrate of the Transkeian Territories stated that “that while upwards of 38,000 
titles to native allotments have been granted up to the present…, only 92 transfers were submitted for 
registration in the past nine months”. The magistrate went on to project that at this rate “even allowing 
for forfeitures and re-allotment, it would be two or three hundred years before all the titles changed 
hands” (Ally: 216). The magistrate cited these figures as evidence of “very widespread neglect on the 
part of registered holders to comply with the regulations governing transfer” (ibid). 
As will be explored further below, the historical experience of quitrent holds important lessons for 
contemporary debates around the formalisation and registration of rights, illustrating the 
inappropriateness of promoting individual titling as a policy measure and as a prerequisite for growing 
the smallholder sector. 
There are other portions of land in the former homelands where there is ambiguity over allocation and 
access rights. These include public land owned by municipalities adjacent to small towns. It has been 
argued that such land has potential “for the low intensity cultivation of food crops and (provision of) 
livestock grazing areas in South Africa’s former homeland towns” (Thornton 2009: 19). Case studies 
examining the use of such land emphasise the need to clarify the content of land use rights which may 
be informally allocated to local small-scale producers. 
With the collapse of the bantustan system and the reintegration of the former homeland areas into 
newly demarcated provinces and municipalities as part of the democratic transition, so land 
administration in these areas fell apart, with land being allocated on an increasingly ad hoc basis and 
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land records falling into disarray. It was recognised that the land rights of people in the former 
homelands were now vulnerable to encroachment and/or outright dispossession. Section 25 of the 
constitution required that the government passed legislation to ensure tenure security for all. However, 
it was recognised that this would take some years to conceptualise and promulgate, so interim 
measures were required to protect people’s land rights in these settings. 
In 1996, Parliament passed the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) as a temporary 
measure to protect the land rights of people living in the former homeland areas. This recognised 
customary land rights as well as the rights of beneficial occupation in particular circumstances. The Act 
sought to provide protections for those people who occupied land through long-standing processes of 
custom and usage, but whose rights were un-recorded. It required the consent of the majority of rights 
holders before any decision could be taken which would deprive them of their rights in land. It set out 
procedures regulating the circumstances under which such deprivations could be made. However, 
IPILRA “provides no legal certainty about the nature of the rights it seeks to protect” (Clark and Luwaya 
2017: 9) and has only been applied in a limited number of circumstances. 
Cousins (2007) notes the diversity of de facto tenure arrangements within the former bantustans with 
marked differences in practice between more remote rural areas and rapidly urbanising contexts, as 
urban centres in these areas enlarged. As Cousins observes the emergence of informal land markets in 
areas adjacent to rural towns and larger cities “poses huge challenges to policy”. In tracking the 
changing priorities of tenure policy, he notes that: 
Government’s initial approach to the question of how to give full legal recognition to 
the rights of people in ‘communal’ areas was based on a paradigm of transferring 
ownership from the state to groups or individuals.(Cousins 2007: 285) 
However, several test cases revealed complexities and risks embedded in such an approach. These 
included how to: 
• identify the owners and spatially delimit the unit of ownership; 
• secure the specialised skills, time and resources required for local consultation processes; 
• unpick and make sense of the nested and layered nature of rights in communal areas, given the 
consequences of the complex histories of forced removals, which frequently created conflicting 
and overlapping rights in land; 
• mitigate the tendency for land rights enquiries to quickly surface nascent conflicts, claims and 
counterclaims concerning the legitimacy of the land rights of different occupiers. 
In a bid to circumvent these difficulties, the Land Rights Bill (LRB) was drafted in 1998. This sought to 
create a category of protected rights on land owned by the state in the former reserves and bantustans. 
Critically, the bill provided that the holders of protected rights could not be deprived 
of land without their consent, except by expropriation, for example when land is 
required for public purposes, and with compensation. The Minister of Land Affairs 
would continue to be the nominal owner of the land, but with strictly delimited 
powers. Protected rights vested in the individuals who use, occupy and have access to 
land, but in group systems protected rights would be relative to those shared with 
other members; individual rights must be relative to group rules, as decided on by the 
majority of members. (Cousins 2007: 286) 
The definition of group boundaries remained complex and contested. The LRB sought to address this by 
conceptualizing boundaries as flexible and “determined with reference to who (which group of people) 
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is affected by a particular decision.”(Claassens 2000: 255). The LRB also sought to ensure that group 
rules would ensure fundamental protections for individuals, consistent with the Constitution. The LRB 
recognised that significant state capacity would be required for implementation and proposed that land 
rights officers would need to be based in each district, to administer the Act. 
However, work on the Bill was terminated when Thoko Didiza replaced Derek Hanekom as Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs, on the grounds that the LRB would be too complex and expensive to 
administer. The new Minister rather focused on the drafting of the Communal Land Rights Act (CRLA), 
subsequently passed in 2004. This sought to give the traditional councils wide-ranging controls over the 
occupation, land use and administration of land in the communal areas. However, CLRA was 
subsequently struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2010, on the grounds that there had been 
insufficient public participation in the process leading up to its adoption. 
Undeterred, the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform proceeded with the process of 
drafting the Communal Land Tenure Policy which was published in 2014. This, like the CLRA proposed 
the transfer of ownership of the outer boundaries of portions of state-owned land in the former 
bantustans to traditional councils which would be empowered to allocate “institutional use rights” to 
individuals and families. This policy was widely criticised for its failure to create any mechanisms hold 
traditional councils to account. The disputed policy shaped the formulation of the Communal Land 
Tenure Bill. This gave communities the option to take a resolution (requiring a 60% majority) which 
would allow them to choose whether to have their land managed by:  
• the traditional council;  
• a landholding entity such as a Communal property Association; 
• or another legal entity depending on the circumstances – e.g. the Ingonyama Trust.  
At the same time however, the DRDLR published a draft policy paper on the future of CPAs which 
indicated that no new CPAs would be established in areas which fell under traditional councils – 
effectively nullifying the proviso in the CLTB that people could opt to establish a CPA to hold their land 
(Clark and Luwaya 2017). 
3.2.1 Tenure, land administration and smallholder production in the former bantustan context 
How have tenure arrangements and the collapse of land administration impacted on agricultural 
production in communal areas? There is a persistent narrative that “customary and communal land 
tenure systems are often poorly developed and as a result constrain investments in agriculture by 
smallholders” (Interacademy Council 2004 n.d.). This view surfaces in different forms within numerous 
policy documents and poverty reduction strategies developed across southern Africa.  
However, locally, research findings caution against neat straight-line correlation. Structural and socio-
economic factors appear to predominate as the drivers of deagrarianisation and the exponential decline 
in agricultural output in such settings.  
While data and research on productive and distributive land use remain patchy, there are key studies 
worth noting, even if the findings may reflect contextual particularities and local histories determining 
land access and use.  
In the Eastern Cape, a recent study analyses a range of survey data to conclude “that an overwhelming 
majority of… agricultural households (e.g. 90 per cent in the tribal authority areas) engage in agriculture 
to supplement their food resources”. However, the researchers caution that “very few households can 
be classified as surplus producers that either farm as a principal source of income (less than one per 
cent), or that sell their produce for extra income (about five per cent)”. (Rogan and Reynolds 2017 p. 18) 
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Figure 1: Reasons for farming given in the Eastern Cape highlighting the primacy of agriculture as an extra source of food.  
Source: Rogan and Reynolds (2017). 
 
While noting the tiny fraction of producers involved in production as a main source of food or income, the 
authors identify two beneficial outcomes of household production: 
The first is through the ability of households that farm to avoid hunger or 
malnutrition by supplementing their diets through cultivation. Second, household 
production can reduce income poverty if households are able to sell their surplus 
production for cash (or in-kind goods) or redirect money that would have been spent 
on market procured food items by, instead, consuming food that they have cultivated 
themselves. (Rogan and Reynolds 2017: 7) 
Recent research further analyses the decline of field-based agriculture in the former bantustan areas. 
Research in Mount Frere confirms that people are largely reliant on store-bought maize and that a 
negligible number of households (less than 2%) were able to subsist on maize which they grew 
themselves (Du Toit and Neves, 2007: 18). In many areas arable land lies fallow and much has been 
informally converted to grazing for livestock. People are largely limited to keeping poultry and 
cultivating vegetables and green mielies within fenced or better protected gardens on their homestead 
site. Research confirms that much arable land away from the homestead is no longer in production, 
even in those areas which have fertile soils, and which receive sufficient rainfall for crop production. The 
ubiquity of free ranging livestock makes it highly likely that those who still plant maize in their fields will 
find their crop damaged or destroyed. Few households can absorb this risk, given the high costs of land 
preparation and inputs. 
These trends are further illustrated by de la Hey and Beinart who present a case study of Mbotyi in 
Mpondoland where they have conducted longitudinal research. They find that an array of structural 
factors, buttressed by changing social attitudes and gender relations, have contributed to dwindling 
agricultural production: 
“The area of land cultivated has declined in a context of intensifying environmental 
pressures, decreased access to household labour, perceptions of risk, alternative 
income sources and evolving aspirations. However, our evidence suggests that 
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control of family labour lies at the heart of the problem. Household heads find it very 
difficult to mobilise labour, but cannot, or will not, employ paid workers. Changing 
aspirations among women and young people, as well as the relative freedom that 
they enjoy, has eroded patriarchal controls. Their sense of a good life does not 
generally include agricultural work; it is unlikely, in their eyes, to bring a significant 
additional income”.(de la Hey and Beinart 2017: 769) 
Du Toit observes how much of the discussion about land reform and support for small holder producers 
“seem to proceed in isolation from the basic facts of South African agrarian structure” (2018 p. 1088). 
He argues that the current approach to land reform which seeks to support emergent black commercial 
farmers “implemented in the teeth of climate change, and in the context of rapid agro-food 
restructuring…has no chance of success even on its own terms”. The narrow focus on ‘productionism’ 
ignores important wider debates about what land reform is for, and associated questions about “the 
nature and design of South Africa’s distributive order” (Ibid, p. 1089). 
As Cousins has observed above the agrarian structure is highly stratified with relatively few large 
agribusiness ventures reducing as much as 80% of produce sold on through formal market chains. 
Within the communal areas there remains a marked absence of data. Available sources however 
indicate that stratification is less pronounced with respect to arable production, as much of this has 
been discontinued, or has shifted from fields to home garden areas. However, evidence suggests that 
where livestock ownership is concerned the majority of large and small stock are concentrated in 
relatively few and mostly male hands. 
3.2.2 Understanding the combination of structural and social constraints currently limiting 
employment intensive agriculture in former homeland areas 
At the continental level some scholars have long argued that the evidence of ‘deagrarianisation’ is 
overwhelming.  
A growing number of surveys over the past two decades have signalled the 
widespread appearance of ‘income diversification’ and, by implication, occupational 
shifts in both rural and urban households. Borders between urban and rural areas 
have blurred in the process, as some urban households resort to farming and in turn 
rural households are increasingly engaged in non-agricultural activities, but there is 
no mistaking that the direction of overall change is towards a growing 
preponderance of non-agricultural activities.(Bryceson 1997:  2) 
This income diversification identified by Bryceson is relevant to the emerging distinction between people 
who make use of land assets primarily for subsistence livelihoods augmentation purposes and those who 
can be described as market orientated small-scale producers for whom agricultural output makes a more 
significant contribution to their livelihood strategy. However, in the communal settings both subsistence 
and market orientated producers face enormous structural economic constraints.  
Philip's research as part of the national Second Economy Strategy highlights the fundamental constraints 
which confront attempts to promote employment intensive agriculture in the communal areas. As Philip 
(2010: 2) has noted:  
"The uneven burden of unemployment in poor areas is just one more feature of the 
deep levels of structural inequality in South Africa. This has its roots in key legacies of 
apartheid: the structure of the economy, spatial inequality, and inequality of access 
to human capital development". 
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She cautions that: 
• the informal sector does not provide an easy entry point for self-employment; 
• the penetration of products manufactured in the core economy to the remotest rural village 
limits the opportunities for small-scale manufacturing, which elsewhere would make a 
significant contribution to the rural economy; 
• the increasing dependence of rural households on urban remittances and social grants, coupled 
with deagrarianisation, accelerated by the erosion of the rural institutional fabric with regard to 
land use planning and administration, together with mounting climate risk have all contributed 
to a steep decline in the contribution of agricultural activities to rural household livelihoods.  
The rapid transformation of the food system in South Africa has seen the penetration of large 
supermarket companies exercising control throughout the value chain from production to point of sale. 
By 2014 four major companies accounted for 97% of sales within the formal food retail sector (Battersby 
and Peyton 2014).  
The penetration of supermarkets as highlighted by Philip above also impacts on the potential for local 
agricultural production at both subsistence and market orientated scales. 
A closer examination of the supermarket model suggests it is inherently hostile 
towards smaller producers. The South African food retail market structure resembles 
that of industrialised countries rather than developing countries. Therefore, we 
should expect that the position of South African small farmers vis-à-vis supermarkets 
is similar to that of small farmers in industrialised countries, who are increasingly 
excluded from these value chains.(Heijden and Vink 2013:  68) 
Neves and Du Toit (2013: 94) review the literature (Black and Khan 2002; Aliber 2003; Black 2010; Philip 
2010) to corroborate how “the structural dynamics of urban-based, job-shedding, capital-intensive 
growth have only intensified since 1994, eroding remittances and migrants’ reinvestment in rural areas”. 
They present evidence of how rural households engage in “…complex repertoires of productive economic 
activity, which include – but are not limited to – agriculture” (2013: 101). 
The chart below (Von Fintel and Pienaar 2014) draws on General Household Survey data to examine the 
different sources of income sustaining African households living outside and inside the former 
homelands. As one might expect, households residing in the former homeland areas survive on a mix of 
salaries, remittances and social grants, as well as the ‘grey slice’, denoting income from other 
unspecified sources. 
The chart records that wage income dominates. However, as the contribution of income from social 
grants increases, so the share of income from remittances shrinks, as does the already negligible orange 
slice denoting sales of ‘farm produce’, along with the grey slice, representing income from other 
sources. 
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Figure 2 Main income sources of African households in homeland and non-homeland areas Von Fintel and Pienaar (2014) 
 
 
In characterising the economic factors which shape the former bantustan rural economy Philip argues 
that the deeply skewed character of the South African economy is reflected in the agrarian structure which 
together with migration and changing gender relations drives the declining contribution of agriculture to 
rural livelihoods and constrains local economic activity, cementing dependence on remittances and social 
grants. She emphasises that the patterns exhibited in the figure above have structural roots. 
This dependence is deeply structural. It is not a problem that can be fixed with a 
change of attitudes, but decades of such structural dependence have certainly taking 
a toll on people’s sense of economic agency: their ability to change their material 
conditions and improve their quality of life through their own actions. (Philip 2010: 
21) 
Critically, she posits that: 
These are key reasons why small-scale manufacturing and agro-processing take place 
at such a negligible scale in marginal areas and why there is such a litany of failure 
for the kinds of projects that so many small enterprise development programmes 
have favoured… Often these fledgling enterprises are in fact in raw competition with 
big capital in the core economy, and it’s certainly not a level playing field.(ibid: 12) 
Although she paints a sobering picture, Philip adds an important caveat, conceding that: 
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“That doesn't mean that there are no economic opportunities in such areas – there 
are, and these need to be optimised and supported”. 
However, she argues that in general these opportunities “are limited, they cannot create jobs at the scale 
required and returns tend to be very low". Clearly these findings must be central to the formulation of 
any strategy to promote employment intensive agriculture at different scales. They must also be offset by 
evidence of the persistence of small-scale production to augment household food security and provide 
opportunities for sales through informal and loose value chains. 
The structural limitations posited by Philip have been revisited by Aliber (2017) who highlights emerging 
evidence of nodes of economic dynamism within the former homelands in the Eastern Cape. He 
distinguishes between urban and rural areas within the former homelands, noting that the rural areas 
have been depopulated, while the population in the urban parts has increased substantially. He notes that 
currently employment and self-employment are concentrated in community services, retail and 
construction, while less than 25% of jobs are in the informal sector. 
Aliber confirms that with “the decline in self-provisioning through small-scale farming, towns have 
become much more the centre of rural villagers’ economic lives than was the case 30 or even 20 years 
ago”. In keeping with other research studies cited above Aliber notes that: 
Households in the former homelands devote a large share of their total expenditure 
to food and beverages – yet it would appear that a relatively small share of this food 
originates from these same rural areas (which could have stimulated local economic 
activity and employment in rural areas). The notable exceptions – for example, in 
Peddie most of the meat sold in the butcheries originates from local black farmers – 
merely accentuates this fact.(Aliber 2017: 6) 
The 20-year review on rural transformation (Van der Byl 2014) found that 21% of South Africans 
experienced difficulty in accessing food. This difficulty was higher in rural as opposed to urban areas where 
it was reported that only 24% of black households were involved in agricultural activities. 
3.2.3 Women’s land rights, customary law and land reform 
A wide range of scholarship has illuminated the varied obstacles which women must surmount to obtain 
equitable access to land and to secure their land rights. Clark and Luwaya (2017: 25) point to the 
colonial codification of customary law which reduced women to the status of minors and placed them 
under the authority of men. They note that “historically there have always been independent, 
unmarried women with access to land,” but that this did not fit with the narrative promoted by 
patriarchal colonial and indigenous authority. 
 A three province survey (Budlender, Mgweba et al. 2011) involving widespread consultations in 
Keiskammahoek In the Eastern Cape , Msinga in KwaZulu-Natal  and  Ramatlabama in North West 
Province, showed how women started to gain independent access to land in the period following the 
transition to democracy in 1994. However, the report also highlighted the general precarity of women’s 
land rights across a wide range of tenure regimes including areas: 
• under quitrent title in the former Ciskei;  
• where permissions to occupy (PTOs) had been issued on former SADT land;  
• where land was allocated and administered in terms of localised systems of customary law;  
• where labour tenant families had been awarded land through the land reform programme.   
A wide range of examples of tenure insecurity and barriers to land access for women were identified. 
These included instances where:  
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• Marriages break down, or women are widowed, they may be evicted from their homes by their 
husband’s families; 
• Divorced women who seek to return to the homes where they were born, may be refused 
access by their brothers; 
• Unmarried sisters may be forced out of their natal homes by their brothers, following the death 
of their parents; 
• Married women frequently lack the right to independently access land, and are often treated as 
minors within customary law systems; 
• Patrilineal systems prevent women from independently accessing residential sites as these are 
usually only allocated to men;  
• Women are not represented in fora where decisions about land are taken, such as in tribal 
councils.  
• Tribal courts frequently rule in favour of men, rather than women where land matters are 
concerned.  
Despite all the constraints listed above, there are also numerous examples where women have been 
successful in obtaining access to land in their own right. These examples vary widely from place to place 
across the landscape. However, Claassens has observed that by and large where things had changed 
“the changes only applied to single women, that is widows and women who had never been married. 
Nothing really changed for married women” (Sepotokele 2018: 98) 
Cousins et al (2011) have recorded one such example of change to accommodate the land rights of 
single women. They review how the Mchunu traditional council in Msinga had adapted and changed 
customary law norms in order to accommodate the rising number of women having children outside of 
marriage. This enabled the council to allocate residential sites to single unmarried women who have 
children, although this often came with the proviso that they could only access land near their father’s 
homestead, so as to provide for protection and family oversight. 
Although there are examples of the flexibility and adaptive capacity of living customary law responding 
to changing social circumstances in order to accommodate women’s land needs, there remain strong 
arguments for a Land Reform Framework Act, as proposed by the High Level Panel. This, as Claassens 
proposes, would legally entrench the right to equitable access to land for women, and for poor and 
marginal people more broadly. In turn, this would “require government to report against criteria that 
include gender, race and poverty”(Sepotokele 2018) in monitoring progress towards the realisation of 
rights contained in Section 25 of the Constitution and other applicable sections of the Bill of Rights. 
3.2.4 Distributive uses of land  
Ferguson (2012) cautions that “discussions on land use and land reform often reduce the land question 
to the agrarian question”. He notes that: 
What people do with land is very complex, and not at all obvious. Let us not be too 
quick to suppose that we understand what is going on. When we see untilled fields, 
let us not be so quick to say that the land is ‘unused’. When we see a smallholding, let 
us be careful about dismissing it as ‘not viable’ when we have not yet asked ‘viable 
for what?’… Poor people often do use land to make their livelihoods. But the 
mechanisms that turn land into livelihoods are as much social as they are technical, 
and may turn less on producing goods than on accessing sources of cash and other 
support from others. Often, that is, land leads to livelihood via processes not of 
production, but of distribution… (U)nder the region’s rather severe physical and 
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economic conditions – (which often make farming precarious at best, and at worst an 
out-and-out loss-making proposition) – using land in ways that are principally 
distributive rather than productive may well amount to making the best possible use 
of it.(Ferguson 2012: 169) 
Research studies in the first decade of democracy (Rangan and Gilmartin 2002) indicated how women 
headed households constituted a significant portion of the population in communal areas with 
estimates ranging from a low of 15% to a high of 50% in certain settlements. In these settings where 
women lack direct access to land and livelihood resources access to natural resources on the commons 
provides an important safety net for poor and vulnerable households. 
3.3 Tenure and state development interventions 
The former homelands have provided the terrain for multiple and mostly failed state interventions, 
largely designed and imposed from above. These interventions reveal assumptions about who really has 
control over land in communal areas and are partly enabled by lack of clarity about the real rights of 
individual land holders. A selection of these programmes is briefly reviewed below. The majority have 
been ‘tech driven’, tenure and gender blind, saddling land rights holders with economic and ecological 
debt, while providing a secure stream of benefit to input suppliers.   
3.3.1 The Massive Food Production Programme 
Berliner (2015) records how between 2003 – 2008 R150 million food programme was implemented in 
the former communal areas of Amathole District of the Eastern Cape. This included the introduction of a 
number of GM crops promoted by an agro chemical company. 
An external review was undertaken of this failed initiative characterising it as “a highly centralised 
agricultural project, imposed on extremely vulnerable farmers, incurring significant environmental costs, 
reduced soil fertility, caused loss of indigenous crop strains, and farmers, who had little or no say in the 
uptake of these projects, found themselves saddled with debt and no means to pay it off” (2015 n.p.). 
Uncertainties about tenure rights in the District have placed the state in a powerful position to impose 
development initiatives on local land rights holders, even if these may have the effect of further 
undermining their livelihood security and degrading natural assets. 
3.3.2 The Food Security Programme/ Green Revolution initiative 
This initiative involved delivery of ‘packages’ of tillage, GM Seeds, fertilisers, herbicides and insecticides 
providing benefits for contractors and almost no-one else. Ecological impacts associated with the 
dumping of agrochemical ‘solutions’ have been significant. 
No less than six recently published scientific studies have found that GM maize 
contaminated the indigenous seed strain supplies of smallholder farmers in the 
Eastern Cape. Genetic contamination from the GM insect-resistant Bt-maize was 
found in fields, home gardens and local household seed holdings in a village where 
GM maize had been grown from 2001 to 2008.(Berliner 2015: n.p.) 
3.3.3 Communal areas and the NDP 
The changing context and the structural factors impacting on the rural economy seldom specifically 
inform the content of strategies and plans seeking to enlarge small holder agriculture. Chapter 6 of the 
National Development Plan makes proposals for an integrated and inclusive rural economy. What is 
striking about the chapter is how little analysis it provides of the historical and contemporary factors 
allude to in the preceding sections which shape the rural economy.  
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While the NDP places emphasis on irrigation this ignores the extent to which “the post-apartheid state 
has presided over the collapse of smallholder irrigation schemes previously supported by homeland 
parastatals” and the extent to which attempts to rehabilitate these schemes “have seen little return, or 
worse have resulted in perverse development outcomes” (Van Averbeke, Dennison et al. 2011: 805). 
Critiques of the NDP have taken different positions. Sender (2014) has argued for more state support to 
agriculture as a critical creator of employment while Cousins (2015) has argued for emphasis on a 
strategy of promoting small-scale agriculture that encourages ‘accumulation from below’. 
Chapter 6 exhibits analytic shorthands and makes optimistic projections which do not appear to be 
firmly grounded in rural realities. 
Traditionally, agriculture was a livelihood asset to the rural poor when other sources 
of income fell away. This role was always underdeveloped because of apartheid, but 
is diminishing further owing to increases in social grants and employment 
opportunities elsewhere. Agriculture, however, has the potential to expand if the 
necessary environment can be created. Better land use in communal areas has the 
potential to improve the livelihoods of the lease 370,000 people. (National Planning 
Commission 2012: 198) 
The core focus of the NDP is on expanding commercial agriculture which is projected to have the 
potential to create 250,000 direct jobs and a further 130,000 indirect jobs. According to the drafters 
these employment opportunities could be created by picking “winning agricultural subsectors where the 
expansion in production and further value adding processes are sustainable over the long-term” (ibid 
200). 
The NDP states that: 
The first major risk to the programme is that tenure security for black farmers in the 
communal areas and under the land reform programme will not be adequately 
addressed. As long as these farmers brackets especially women farmers) do not have 
security any, they will not invest, and agricultural production will not grow at the rate 
and pattern required for growth in employment.(Ibid: 204) 
However, the NDP only makes vague recommendations as to how this tenure insecurity should be 
addressed: 
Create tenure security for communal farmers. Tenure security is vital to secure 
incomes for all existing farmers and for new entrants. Investigate the possibility of 
flexible systems of land use for different kinds of farming on communal lands. (Ibid: 
205) 
3.3.3.1 Tenure and the revitalisation of irrigation schemes 
The National Development Plan also emphasises the potential of smallholder irrigations as a source of 
employment. It is envisaged that the rehabilitation of collapsed smallholder irrigation schemes (SIS) 
could create as many as 300,000 job opportunities by 2020. This prompted the investment of R2 billion 
or R40000 a hectare into the establishment, revitalisation and rehabilitation of such schemes.(Fanadzo 
and Ncube 2018). However, the results of this investment are reported to be disappointing. Multiple 
factors are identified which contribute to the poor performance of revitalised schemes. Amongst these, 
tenure features prominently, although there are widely differing perspectives on the nature of the 
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problem and potential solutions. These mirror ongoing debates about land tenure security, women’s 
land rights and the appropriateness of titling.  
A 2010 review of proposed land tenure and land administration interventions to increase productivity 
smallholder irrigation schemes found that: 
The institutions and tools to handle efficient land transactions, particularly in the 
form of leases, were in most instances not available. The reform of two old order 
forms of tenure, is proposed, to add to the variety of tenure options. It is 
recommended that quitrent tenure be transformed to a perpetual or long-term 
conditional state lease system and the PTO system to be transformed to usufruct or 
statutory rights which should both be underpinned by different levels of local level 
land administration system. (Manona et al. 2010: 3) 
The review emphasised the importance of effective land administration systems on smallholder 
irrigation schemes to enhance tenure security and facilitate land-lease markets. This suggested that 
institutional capacity and back end systems were key ingredients required to enable land rights 
management and associated transactional processes on the ground. Research by Cousins in the Tugela 
Ferry area reveals an intricate interplay between different actors in the allocation of rights and the 
operation of an irrigation scheme established at the turn of the 20th century. Both Chiefs and 
government officials play a role in allocation plots while local farmers associations have been 
established to exercise an oversight function. 
Rights to plots are socially and politically embedded. Most farmers have inherited 
their plots although some are occasionally reallocated to others who approach the 
chief through one of the committees and pay a khonza (affiliation) fee. Plots are 
considered to be family rather than individual property but control the production 
and income is exerted by the individual user. Most irrigation farmers are women and 
many obtain rights to plots through marriage.(Cousins 2012: 16) 
A recent review of research (Fanadzo and Ncube 2018) indicates that on most smallholder irrigation 
schemes men are the registered plot holders, although women are predominantly responsible for 
production. There are continuing debates about the link between secure tenure, the value of land as 
collateral and the ability raise finance for production. As noted above, one school of thought sees the 
lack of ownership of land as the dominant constraint preventing smallholders from applying for 
production loans. However, as Manona et al. (2010) have argued, reform to strengthen existing forms of 
tenure and investment in the development of scheme-based land-administration systems could provide 
legal certainties for land rights and lease contracts. The work of Thomson suggests that the 
strengthening and adaptation of existing customary tenure systems to provide greater certainty and 
protection of exclusive rights can be effective in reducing the risk associated with agricultural 
production. However, questions still remain as to how far these measures would facilitate access to 
finance and provide security against loan default. 
It is clear from this section that three factors impede the development of functioning transparent land 
rights recordal and equitable land administration systems: 
• the failure to pass legislation to realise the rights to tenure security in communal settings as 
guaranteed in Section 25 of the constitution;  
• the ongoing lack of clarity about the role of traditional leaders in former communal areas and 
their powers to allocate and administer land;  
• lack of state support for land recordal and administration functions at local level. 
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While there is ample evidence that in mining affected communities there has been abuse of power by 
traditional authorities who have abrogated the land and tenure rights of rural citizens there is also a 
counter narrative where traditional authorities are responsive to the people they represent and provide 
support to enable customary tenure systems to adapt and provide a measure of security for all. 
Perhaps the most extreme version involving the distortion of customary law institutions relates to the 2, 
8 million ha of land which fall under the Ingonyama Trust which is briefly discussed below: 
3.4 Ingonyama trust 
The Ingonyama Trust was established through a deal between the National Party and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party just before the democratic transition in 1994. The Trust was established to manage 2.8 
million ha of land owned by the former homeland government of KwaZulu. 
This land vests in the Ingonyama, King Zwelithini, as trustee on behalf of members of communities 
defined in the Act. This was amended in 1997 to create the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Board to 
administer the land in accordance with the Act. 
Research commissioned for the HLP noted a range of provisions in the Act intended to protect the land 
rights of Trust beneficiaries. The report highlighted acknowledgements by the Ingonyama Trust Board 
that “the people living on the land have strong rights to use the land in various ways…” but recorded 
that: 
…despite these statements and the protective provisions contained in the Ingonyama 
Trust Act, the Trust has been subject to a great deal of controversy for failing to 
protect the land rights of people living on the land it administers. The Trust has come 
under fire for its ongoing conclusion of long-term surface lease agreements with 
mining companies, in terms of which it signs lease agreements with mining 
companies to enable mining activities on land which is often occupied and used by 
local communities. These agreements are sometimes concluded without proper 
community consultation and lead to the deprivation of use rights and access to land.  
(Clark and Luwaya 2017: 10). 
The report noted that the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform 
“has raised serious concerns about the revenue received by the Trust and the apparent failure on the 
part of the Trust to reroute its revenue back to the beneficiaries of the Trust” (HLP 2017: 203). 
The report of the High Level Panel noted that: 
At the hearings people complained that they are currently more vulnerable to 
dispossession than they were before 1994. The problem is especially acute in areas 
where mining is taking place in former homeland areas, and in areas administered by 
the Ingonyama Trust in KwaZulu-Natal. People complain that traditional leaders and 
officials deny their land rights (including long-standing customary rights) and assert 
that traditional leaders have the sole authority to sign agreements with investors in 
respect of communal land. 
The HLP recorded with concern that “the Ingonyama Trust Board has control over 
land in ways that far surpass anything the Minister of Rural Development and Land 
Reform has in all other provinces” (HLP 2017: 274). 
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The HLP report confirms that the ITB has been converting the original PTOs into lease agreements with a 
40-year term. It highlights several onerous conditions in the lease agreements: 
• lessees have to pay site rentals to the ITB, with rents escalating by 10% per annum; 
• lessees are to fence their property within six months and to obtain written permission to build 
or make improvements; 
• failure to pay the rent may trigger cancellation of the lease and enable the ITB to take over any 
building or structures on the land, when the site is vacated. 
The HLP noted that in the 2015/16 financial year the ITB received rental income of more than 96 million 
rand. The HLP report records that “there is little evidence” that this revenue “is used for the benefit of 
communities or their material well-being” (2017: 275). 
The section in the recent report of the presidential advisory panel on land reform and agriculture which 
deals with tenure in communal areas and related property rights surfaces differences among the 
panellists concerning the role of traditional leaders, land rights and land administration in communal 
areas.  
However, in its recommendations the report echoes the HLP calling for the drafting of the permanent 
statutory protection and procedural safeguards for informal and customary land rights in the former 
bantustans in the form of the Protection of Informal Land rights Act. The panel also endorses 
recommendations from the HLP with regard to the Ingonyama Trust, stating that the act needs to be 
reviewed or possibly repealed.  
Despite the differences in perspective among panellists on the role of traditional leaders the advisory 
panel report states that effectively “the Ingonyama Trust Act has perpetuated the existence of the 
KwaZulu homeland within a unitary state 25 years into the new democratic order”(Presidential Advisory 
Panel 2019:  46) 
Space precludes undertaking a detailed analysis of the tenure and land administration particularities 
pertaining to each of the former homeland areas. Suffice it to say that there are many differences, as 
well as similarities between them. The current bid to pass the so-called Bantustan Bills is widely 
regarded as a means to render 17 million rural citizens as the subjects of traditional authorities and 
enable elite pacting and deal-making around mining and other natural resources. These factors all form 
part of the terrain which must be successfully navigated, if tenure rights are to be secured and labour-
intensive employment creation from revitalised smallholder production is to be stimulated in communal 
areas. 
3.5 Coloured Rural Areas 
There are 23 coloured rural areas (CRAs) in four provinces (Western Cape, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape 
and Free State) where land historically reserved for people of mixed Khoisan and European descent is 
held in trust by the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform2. The majority of these CRAs 
originated in mission-linked settlements and related land acquisitions.  
The Mission Stations and Communal Reserves Act (No. 29 of 1909) of the Cape Colony first brought a 
number of mission stations and independent reserves under statutory control.  
The Act reaffirmed the principle of communal tenure in the reserves, although it 
made provisions for eventual subdivision of land. Subsequent legislation…made 
 
2 This section draws from https://knowledgebase.land/act-9-rural-areas/ - Phuhlisani NPC’s knowledge hub on land and reform. 
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provisions for the introduction of so-called betterment schemes, in which communal 
land could be divided into ‘economic units’ for selected individuals or small groups of 
farmers. (May and Lahiff 2007: 785) 
Management Boards or Rade were established and chaired by the local magistrate. Selected 
government officials and local residents were appointed to sit on the board. In several areas there was 
popular resistance to these boards which were regarded as being unrepresentative. 
The 1909 Act was replaced by the Coloured Persons Communal Reserves Act (No. 3 of 1961). This Act 
drew on definitions in the 1950 Population Registration Act which classified people into “White”, 
“Native” (members of indigenous African groups) and “Coloured” who the Act defined as “not a white 
person or a native”(Wisborg 2006). Finally, the Rural Areas Act (No. 9 of 1987) was passed by the House 
of Representatives in the tricameral parliament, established in the dying days of apartheid. The drive to 
replace Act 9 with a new law, arose from local struggles in the 1980s to resist attempts by the state to 
privatise communal rangelands in the Northern Cape. This was attempted through the determination of 
economic units and the individualized allocation of land to larger stockowners, which the state 
characterized as ‘proper’ livestock farmers.  
Act 9 was eventually replaced by the Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act (No. 94 of 1998) — 
TRANCRAA. Although the Act was promulgated more than 20 years ago, the transformation process is 
far from complete. TRANCRAA communities have expressed the frustrations on numerous occasions. 
They called for a summit with the Minister, which took place in 2012. This resulted in a reconstituted 
task team to drive the transformation process, but the team was reportedly ineffective in its work, and 
there were calls at the National Land Summit in 2014 for the process to be reconstituted yet again. 
Act 94 of 1998 legislates the process required for bone fide rights holders on the land to reach 
agreement on how the land should be held.  This process should have been completed within a 
transitional period of 18 months, from the date gazetted by the Minister (17 July 2009).  This should 
have enabled:  
• a land rights enquiry to establish existing land use rights;  
• a proposed land use development plan;  
• compilation and verification of list of ‘residents’ as at 2 November 1998;  
• proven consultation with the community on the choice of entity;  
• a facilitated process to enable the community to decide on the type of entity to hold the land;  
• a report to the Minister recommending the choice of entity/entities, who if satisfied with the 
recommendations, must then implement the transfer. 
In most TRANCRAA areas there is an established residential area or declared township, with surveyed 
residential erven, business, community, transport and open-space zones. Commonage lands also exist to 
which individuals have use rights for cultivation and grazing. Land within the township vests in the local 
municipality, but residents/rights holders are required to decide whether they want the commonage 
land to also be administered by the municipality, or to be transferred to a Communal Property 
Association, or other approved landholding entity. 
Section 4(2) of TRANCRAA states that, despite the provisions of any law regarding the disposal of 
municipal land in a township, the residents must be given reasonable preference to acquire Trust land in 
the remainder, that is the commonage and agricultural area outside the township (section 3(1)). 
Where land outside the declared township is to be transferred to a landholding entity, the Minister must 
be satisfied that the arrangements make provision to balance security of tenure and protection of 
existing land use rights. This must accommodate: 
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• the needs of the residents as a whole; 
• individual members of the entity; 
• resident and future occupiers and users of the land; 
• access to the common land in the public interest; 
• processes which enable continuation or termination of existing use rights. 
The Minister is required to ensure procedural compliance, so that where the consultations did not take 
place within the prescribed timeframe, or with the requisite attention to detail, the Minister may lay 
down conditions specifying particular steps, rights enquiries and processes of consultation which must 
take place to enable the drafting of community rules and regulations, which will govern the allocation 
and administration of the land into the future (Ward 2 forum 2017). 
These processes have yet to be completed for the majority of TRANCRAA areas. This creates 
uncertainties concerning access and use of agricultural land in these areas, given that to qualify for state 
agricultural support, occupiers of land need to demonstrate that they have secure rights for at least a 
five-year period, to the land they plan produce on. 
CRAs range widely in size and access to landholding. In the Northern Cape, CRAs are extensive. In areas 
such as Namaqualand land rights holders are reported to have benefitted extensively from acquisition of 
land in terms of redistribution, via the municipal commonage programme. Between 1996 and 2007 
more than 1,8 million ha of extensive grazing land were acquired in Namaqualand, which increased 
access to land by 20% over a ten-year period. 
Although considerable progress has been made with regard to the acquisition of 
commonage, the model of land-use and land administration poses many concerns. 
The model of land-use being implemented on the new commonage land in 
Namaqualand is based on the prevailing land-use practices of white commercial 
farmers in the area, rather than on the communal system prevailing on the older 
commonage. This new model involves individualisation of grazing holdings (occupiers 
pay for exclusive use of certain camps), enforcement of prescribed stocking rates 
(based on the concept of carrying capacity), and rotational grazing.(May and Lahiff 
2007: 788) 
Research, (Lebert and Rohde 2007) suggests that the newly acquired land has benefited local elites as 
opposed to the poor majority.  
From a land tenure and administration perspective commonage has been thought to offer advantages in 
that it requires the establishment of a co-management institution, while the rules and regulations 
regulating access and use of the Commons can be formulated as municipal bylaws. This means that the 
state retains ownership of the land, allocates use rights and levies user fees. It also places obligations on 
the state, which remains responsible for maintenance of essential infrastructure on the land.  
However, in practice many local municipalities are increasingly dysfunctional and lack the resources to 
manage commonage, maintain fencing and water points on the land. They may also lack capacity and 
political will to collect grazing fees from those who can afford to pay. This has meant that in 
Namaqualand infrastructure on the land has become run down, while stocking rates on the old 
commons are reported to be almost double those prescribed by the Department of Agriculture, and 
those on adjacent commercial farms (Benjaminsen, Rohde et al. 2006). The question remains as to how 
land tenure rights and residual grazing systems intersect with the contemporary management of 
extensive rangelands in the CRAs. Climate change projections which forecast warming of between 5 – 8 
degrees over the interior, coupled with drier conditions in the west of the country, pose serious 
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challenges to the sustainability of small stock farming, in already harsh circumstances. This suggests 
sharply increased pressure on available resources, which will require greater clarity on tenure rights and 
investment in localised land administration to prevent resource capture and exclusion by local elites. 
In instances where land tenure rights remain unclear, opportunities are created for elites to capture the 
lion’s share of land acquired through land reform in the TRANCRAA areas, and more broadly across the 
land reform programme. This is examined in depth in the following section.  
3.6 Land reform 
Individuals and households who have acquired land through different elements of the land reform 
programme frequently lack clarity concerning their individual and household tenure rights. Further, 
currently there is no meaningful state support to enable land holding entities to allocate and administer 
land rights of their members.  
In 2009, the impact of inadequate programme design was assessed through a review of econometric 
data. This came to the worrying, if qualified, conclusion that land reform could have had unintended 
consequences for household food security of beneficiaries. 
“Comparing beneficiary and non-beneficiary households with similar distributions for 
a rich set of covariates, propensity score matching estimates indicate that households 
who say they have received a land grant are more likely to report difficulties in 
satisfying their food needs than non-land grantees” (Valente 2009: 1542) 
This was primarily because the land reform programme has focused primarily on enabling access to land 
without adequately engaging with the constraints that people acquiring land will face if they want to 
bring it into production, irrespective of scale. With limited post transfer support and where land reform 
offers few opportunities to pursue multiple livelihoods, many land reform beneficiaries who gain access 
to land have few options but to remain where they are currently living but move family members and 
resources between two locations. This has the potential to drain rather than enlarge household 
resources, particularly as transport costs continue to escalate. 
Land holding entities lack capacity to record and manage rights or specify and enforce responsibilities of 
individual land rights holders. Such responsibilities include individual contributions to the maintenance 
and upkeep of resources - water points, fencing and related production infrastructure, together with a 
pro rata contribution to the payment of rates which are levied after the expiry of the 10-year exemption 
period on the land acquired through land reform. 
3.6.1 Land restitution 
By 1998 63 455 claims were lodged by 31 December 1996 of which 3190 were dismissed. The deadline 
was subsequently extended to 31 December 1998 which boosted the total claims lodged to 79 696. 
Research commissioned by the HLP estimated that more than 7 000 claims remained unsettled, while 
19 000 old order claims were still to be finalised. It was calculated that at the current rate of processing 
560 claims a year it would take 35 years to finalise existing claims. Researchers further estimated that it 
would take 143 years to settle the new claims lodged in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights 
Amendment Act of 2014. This process was subsequently halted by the Constitutional Court. Should the 
process be re-opened and a further estimated 397 000 additional claims are added, it could take 
another 709 years to settle and finalise these, if current processing rates remain constant.  
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3.6.1.1 Tenure and land administration issues in the restitution claim settlement process 
An implementation evaluation of the restitution programme (Genesis Analytics 2014) produced a flow 
chart indicating the steps and pathways involved in the settlement of a land claim. 
Figure 3: The Restitution claim settlement flow chart (Genesis Analytics) 
 
In cases where a restitution claim involves a land award in terms of Section (42)(D) or Section (42) there 
is a significant silence on processes to formulate tenure arrangements and specify individual and 
household rights on the restored land. The only tangential reference to this appears in Step six with the 
establishment of a legal entity – usually a Communal Property Association to hold the land on behalf of 
bona fide claimants. This step focuses on the transfer of the property as a whole to the newly 
constituted legal entity. Thereafter implementation of ‘post settlement support’ envisages the drafting 
of the mini business plan and the transfer of responsibility for implementation to “post settlement 
support i.e. recapitalisation and development”. These steps rest on a series of unspoken assumptions: 
• that the claimant community will continue with production already established on the restored 
land; 
• that production will be undertaken on behalf of the claimant group; 
• that members of the claimant community will remain off-site and will not settle on the land; 
• there will be no formal or informal subdivision and individual rights in land will not be 
demarcated; 
Tenure arrangements and the allocation of rights and responsibilities assume an additional layer of 
complexity in certain restitution contexts. In these instances, claimants have struggled to have land from 
which they were dispossessed restored and may seek to recreate the status quo which pre-existed 
before their dispossession.  
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Deborah James has documented the complex history of Doornkop from which residents were forcibly 
removed in 1974 and which was restituted 20 years later in 1994. She observes how “socio-economic 
differentiation in the community already entrenched when the former occupants were forcibly 
removed… re-emerged after the farms restitution and became entrenched in leadership/rank and file 
divisions. Those resettling on the farm relied on a mostly absent elite – whom they elected to the 
committee – to represent the interests”. (James 2006:  9) 
James narrates how:  
“By 2001 Doornkop been invaded by more than a hundred families of shack dwellers 
who claimed to have lived there in the pre-removal period. Indeed, some poorer CPA 
members had “sold” plots, illegally, to those “squatters”, in an attempt to augment 
their meagre incomes... The resulting crisis of leadership was exacerbated by 
uncertainty about exactly which land was owned by whom. Residents claim that if 
there had been certain of their specific property rights from early on (a matter of 
ownership), they – or their representatives, the CPA committee – would have been 
empowered to evict the squatters on their behalf before the problem escalated. Lack 
of certainty about property rights likewise caused vacillation amongst co-owners 
about holding other members of the CPA accountable.”(Ibid: 10) 
James highlights how in the case of Doornkop (and arguably in many other CPAs) “a model of 
communality, combined with inattention to the precise nature and content of property rights has served 
to paralyse leaders”. 
Despite the long democratic tradition of the land buyers at Doornkop and their independence from 
chiefly power since the 1800s, the problems emanating from the ineffectiveness of CPA style 
governance prompted some other members to reconsider the option of instating chiefly/customary 
authority to manage access to the land. James observes that: 
Such sentiments, rather than being seen as a wholehearted endorsement of 
traditional leadership, represent a critical commentary on the opacity and 
ineffectiveness of CPA committees: groups of (mostly male) office-holders whose 
deliberations and machinations are a mystery to most, who fail to deliver on 
numerous promises of development, and who in many cases do not even live on the 
restored farms but travel there infrequently from the cities where they reside and 
work. Similar problems, widely reported, suggest profound flaws in the assumption – 
enshrined in the original legislation - that communal landholding would 
automatically be translated into harmonious and conflict-free leadership. Instead, 
there is a “breakdown of communication between the leadership and members”, as 
well as “inequitable allocation of assets based on self-help; mismanagement; the 
squandering of opportunity; a disregard for internal rules”. The result has been that 
“infrastructure and land are left to deteriorate” (Pienaar 2000:327). (Ibid: 12) 
James searches for possible solutions created by this impasse and opts for a proposal put forward many 
years back by Kobus Pienaar who argued that if land holding entities are to be effective: 
 This requires making the state responsible to support the allocation and 
administration of the rights of individuals to use the land. The implication of 
this…would be to recognize that the state has a role to play in administering 
relationships, and regulating conflict, between co-owners, as much as it does 
between neighbours in a city context. 
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According to Pienaar (2000) in James (2006: 11):  
Other property relations in society do get a lot of state support from local 
government, which helps to define your relationship with the street, your neighbours, 
the area in front of your house, and so on. There are public institutions, like the Deeds 
Registry, the Surveyor-General’s office, which perform these functions. … It is 
presumed that people in CPAs must take charge themselves, but no-one would expect 
this in the case of normal individually-owned property”. 
From Doornkop to Schmidtsdrift oversimplified notions of ‘the community’, the failure to address land 
tenure and determine member’s individual/household land rights have surfaced complex conflicts of 
interest and values. Weak institutions, and the failure to conceptualise appropriate planning and 
support has come at a high cost and failed to unlock key assets for the benefit of the poor. 
The poverty of restitution? The case of Schmidtsdrift 
Schmidtsdrift was declared Crown Trust Land in 1827. Setswana-speaking Batlhaping and a number of Griqua 
clans lived together in the area. After the 1913 Native Land Act became law, the area was scheduled as the 
Schmidtsdrift Native Reserve.  
In 1939 Schmidtsdrift was proclaimed a betterment area in terms Proclamation No 31 of 1930. Betterment 
planning was implemented in 1960.This involved a series of strictly enforced measures to control land use and 
grazing. These are said to have included a ban on ploughing in certain areas and the forced culling/auctioning of 
livestock. The betterment scheme resulted in people being moved from a more dispersed settlement pattern 
into six designated residential areas.  
After 1948 the National party embarked on a series of measures to separate Griquas and Tswanas who both 
lived in the area and who had developed ties through intermarriage and a long history of co-existence.  
This initially involved forcible relocation of Griquas to other areas. In the 1950s, to avoid such relocation a group 
of around 17 Griqua families in the Fonteintjie area opted to be reclassified as Tswanas. This enabled them to 
continue to occupy land at Schmidtsdrift.  
Despite considerable state investment in the betterment planning it was subsequently decided to remove the 
whole Schmidtsdrift community. In early 1968 the apartheid regime forcibly relocated the community to “trust 
farms” which had been purchased north-east of Kuruman. 
The forced removal served to disperse and divide people who had previously lived as neighbours. This meant 
that when the opportunity arose to reclaim lost land, people with historical rights at Schmidtsdrift acted 
independently to lodge competing claims on the land.  
Representatives of the Batlhaping community, the bulk of whom lived in Kuruman and Kimberley, formed the 
Schmidtsdrift Tswana Community Trust and lodged their claim with the Advisory Commission on Land Allocation 
in 1992. The claim was rejected by ACLA and after a combination of community activism and negotiation was 
submitted to the newly established  
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) in 1996.  The CRLR also received competing claims on the same 
land from persons who identified themselves as the Kleinfonteintjie community - descendants of Griqua 
inhabitants previously residing at Schmidtsdrift.  
After negotiations the Schmidtsdrift Community Development Trust and the Fonteintjie Community Trust 
signed a final settlement agreement which stipulated that both communities recognise that each had lost rights 
in the land and agreed to settle their respective claims as one. Following this agreement, the Schmidtsdrift 
Tswana Community Trust and the Fonteintjie Development Trust merged into the Interim Committee of the 
Schmidtsdrift CPA.  
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Clause 7 of the settlement agreement required that the two groups have equal representation in a single CPA, 
despite the fact that the Schmidtsdrift Tswana Community Trust, represented about 675 verified households 
while the Kleinfonteintjie Community contained about 85 verified households.  
This clause has turned out to be highly problematic as it gave the Fonteintjie group who represented 12.6% of 
the claimant community a 50% representation in management. The 50% representation on the CPA Committee 
was interpreted by some to imply that Fonteintjie members were entitled to a 50% share in the property and 
subsequent revenue from diamond mining. The settlement agreement triggered a series of intractable disputes 
which neither mediation nor court proceedings could satisfactorily resolve. (de Satge, Mayson et al. 2010) 
 
Both the cases of Doornkop and Schmidtsdrift highlight nascent social contestations, exacerbated by the 
passing of time and recast by the batching of restitution claims. These have threatened to overwhelm 
the restitution programme as a whole. In these settings processes to try and clarify and record individual 
land rights and entitlements to minerals and natural resources inevitably trigger disputes. 
In the case of Schmidtsdrift, all the contesting actors and interest groups invoked the will of ‘the 
community’ to legitimate their positions and emphasise their popular support. This highlighted the 
plurality of ‘communities’ and interest groups, who in terms of the settlement agreement all made up 
the membership of the CPA. These included: 
• local residents residing in different settlements on the property – some of whom were 
supportive of the CPA leadership, while others were vehemently opposed to it and refused to 
recognise its legitimacy; 
• people on and off site who supported the return of traditional governance structures and who 
were variously allied with individuals claiming the status of chiefs; 
• people with particular affiliations and claims on space and place who sought to return to 
establish new settlements in the area where they used to stay prior to dispossession; 
• people of Griqua origin staying off site in surrounding towns, but who claimed grazing rights and 
entitlement to a share of benefits from diamond mining; 
• people who had been dispossessed, but wished to continue to stay in the areas to which they 
were removed in Kuruman, who were doubly concerned about their tenure security on the land 
to which they had been removed, together with their rights and entitlements as former 
residents of Schmidtsdrift. 
Schmidtsdrift, like many restitution cases provides insight into the enormous complexity involved in 
trying to reverse the social engineering of apartheid. The institutional and management capacity 
required to:  
• record and maintain a register of members;  
• allocate land and tenure rights;  
• transparently manage a 24,000 ha landholding with both formal and informal settlement areas;  
• allocate mineral and irrigation rights, while also dealing with increasing numbers of displaced 
people being evicted from surrounding farms and accommodated as tenants, or being 
informally allocated land on the property.  
Unsurprisingly, the skills and costs of carrying out these functions completely outstripped both the 
capacity of members of the claimant community and officials from the relevant government 
departments and local municipality. The case of Schmidtsdrift raises serious questions about what can 
realistically be done to ensure equitable access to land, enhance livelihood opportunities and ensure 
sustainable resource management in socially contested and deeply stratified settings. 
       
38 
 
The identification and recordal of a legally defensible and socially equitable bundle of individual 
household rights in land and entitlements to land based resources seems fundamental here. Without 
this, and the backing of a state supported, publicly accountable, adequately resourced and capacitated 
management and land administration entity, key resources will be captured by powerful elites and the 
pro-poor goals of land reform will not be met. 
3.6.1.2 Questions about the viability of the restitution programme 
The viability of the restitution programme as a whole is questionable. It has been consistently 
undermined by pressure on the Commission to settle claims to meet arbitrarily imposed political 
deadlines. For example, in February 2002 President Mbeki set a target for the settlement of all land 
claims by 2005. When it became clear that this deadline could not be met, it was further adjusted to 
February 2008. In a bid to show reasonable progress and show evidence of accelerated claim 
settlement, the CRLR was forced into taking shortcuts – many of which proved fatal to the subsequent 
sustainability of the claims process. Of these shortcuts the most significant was the “artificial and 
unauthorised consolidation of claims… and, ultimately the finalisation of incomplete and legally flawed 
settlements”(Du Plessis 2018: 28). 
The restitution programme was the subject of evaluation by the Department of Planning, Monitoring 
and Evaluation between 2013 and 2014. The evaluation covered implementation of the programme 
from January 1999 - 31st of March 2013 and an improvement plan was approved in August 2014. 
However, as research commissioned for the report of the High Level Panel makes clear, many elements 
in this improvement plan have yet to be effectively implemented. The commission and the claimants are 
struggling with the consequences of the consolidation of claims which was undertaken to speed 
community claim settlement processes. However, this has created intensely complex problems, creating 
large dysfunctional groups of people “who in many instances have no shared identity, and in some 
instances have serious internal disputes with one another” (High Level Panel 2017: 249). The fatal flaws 
embedded in a vision where restitution somehow seeks to restore the past and make restoration of land 
seized through colonial and apartheid dispossession have made this dimension of land reform intensely 
difficult to implement.  
3.6.2 Land redistribution 
The land redistribution programme has evolved in clearly delimited phases since its beginnings within 
the Mandela presidency. The sections below briefly explore the evolution of the redistribution 
programme up to the present day. 
Phase 1: Land redistribution via eligibility for settlement and land acquisition grants 
Under the Mandela presidency land redistribution policy emphasised a pro poor focus. However, 
resources allocated to land reform were limited and concerns about maintaining equity between land 
reform beneficiaries and those in need of housing meant that the settlement and land acquisition grant 
was indexed to the value of an individual housing subsidy at the time. As a result, many households had 
to join together to pool their grants in order to make up the purchase price to acquire land through the 
market and the willing buyer willing seller mechanism. The settlement and land acquisition grant was 
augmented by a planning grant.  
The first phase of the redistribution programme resulted in large groups of people taking ownership of a 
property which was then transferred to a landholding entity. These entities were either Trusts 
established in terms of the Trust Property Control Act or Communal Property Associations established in 
terms of the Act developed by the Department of Land Affairs, specifically for land reform purposes.  
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Concerns about the viability of this approach were twofold:  
• How were large numbers of people were somehow supposed to derive benefits and/or a 
livelihood from a landholding which often had been unable to support the original white 
landowner and his workers?  
This was particularly challenging since subdivision was not on the agenda and there was an assumption 
that new landowners continue with the same enterprises, but now under collective or group production. 
• What to do about the ‘rent a crowd’ phenomenon where powerful and politically connected 
individuals colluded with officials to register relatives and others as co-applicants for grants in 
order to obtain singular ownership of a property? 
The first phase of land reform was not exclusively concerned with the SLAG grant. There was also 
emphasis on other redistribution mechanisms including the acquisition of land for municipal 
commonage and state support for farm worker equity schemes which were introduced from 1997. 
Phase 2: Land redistribution through LRAD 
Under the Mbeki presidency the land reform programme started to shift away from its original pro-poor 
focus and concentrate on providing access to land and support for emerging black commercial farmers 
through the Land Reform for Agricultural Development programme (LRAD). A new grant formula offered 
a sliding scale in which the amount of the state’s contribution was linked to the level of an individual’s 
own contribution. This own contribution could also include loans from the Land Bank. This sought to do 
away with the large group projects in Phase 1.  
Due to the relatively expensive nature of LRAD, there were few beneficiaries. Between 
2001/02 and 2005/06, there were only about 3900 households benefiting per year, 
while between 2006/07 and 2008/09 there were fewer than 2000 households 
benefiting per year, despite annual expenditure in excess of R1 billion.  
(Aliber, Mabhera et al. 2016: 34) 
Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) and State Land lease and Disposal policy 
PLAS was first introduced in 2006 and by 2010 was the sole land acquisition model for the redistribution 
programme. According to the report prepared by the Presidential Advisory Panel (2019) some 2200 
farms have been purchased under the PLAS programme. 
Unlike the previous land acquisition mechanisms where land was transferred in ownership to land 
holding entities, the state retained the ownership of the land acquired under PLAS and made it available 
to selected beneficiaries under a leasehold agreement. In most instances those gaining access to land 
through PLAS were required to enter into an agreement with a strategic partner. 
It has been argued that after several land reform policy shifts “old-fashioned modernist orthodoxies… 
have shaped a contorted reform, centred on criteria of commercial ‘viability’ and governed by state 
officials, consultants agribusiness ‘strategic partners’ concerned with surveillance and control of 
‘beneficiaries’ in ‘projects’ with precarious tenure on un-subdivided commercial farms now owned by 
the state” (Hall and Kepe 2017: 122). 
PLAS land is allocated through the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy. This enables people accessing 
land through the programme to lease it for 30 years, renewable for a further 20 years, before they 
become eligible to take ownership of the property. However, in a study conducted in the Eastern Cape, 
no beneficiaries were found to have been issued leases on the land which they occupied. Hall and Kepe 
       
40 
 
observe that the resultant situation was “possibly the opposite of the vision of secure long-term rights 
for black South Africans which was at the core of land reform as envisaged in the 1990s” (Ibid: 126). 
They identify how the insecure tenure status of people acquiring land through the PLAS programme has 
meant that: 
“Other state institutions such as the provincial Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development refused to deliver services or invest in their land uses. People are not 
able to access credit as financial institutions require some proof of their right to 
occupy. As a result, emerging commercial farmers, including those who have capital 
from other sources are being stymied in their farming operations”. (Ibid: 127) 
They conclude that “South Africa’s land reform seems to have succumbed to the ingrained scepticism 
held by officials in successive departments of ‘native affairs’ and ‘bantu affairs’ about secure and 
independent land rights for black people”, and ask whether “without redistribution of power and wealth 
to those who are the ostensible beneficiaries, is it even land reform”? (Ibid: 128) 
3.6.3 Tenure rights in landholding entities  
In a comprehensive land tenure review (Manona, Kingwill et al. 2018) it was noted  that according to the 
CPA Registrar in the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), there were currently 
1483 registered CPAs. In 2010, the Department reported to Parliament that were also 1383 trusts, 
holding land acquired through land reform. In October 2015, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries reported to Parliament that there were 1788 agricultural cooperatives. However, there is 
no available data to indicate how many of the latter had obtained access to land through land reform.  
Landholding entities, or communal property institutions (CPIs) are charged with a complex task of 
holding and managing property on behalf of the members of an association, beneficiaries of a trust or 
cooperative. As indicated in the case of Schmidtsdrift above, this presents particular challenges for 
elected office bearers and ordinary members, who have not undertaken such tasks previously. Particular 
skills are required to handle potentially conflictual issues, such as land allocation and distribution of 
assets, especially when there are powerful actors in the group or community. Where CPAs are 
established to hold land acquired through the restitution programme, the members may not have had 
to take decisions together before. In many instances, the systems and procedures for land rights 
allocation and management are not in place. In certain circumstances, the CPI may find its functions 
overlapping with those of traditional leaders and thus conflict develops between these two bodies.   
In 2009/10 the CPA Annual Report highlighted widespread non-compliance with the CPA Act. CPAs were 
reported to be facing numerous challenges including:  
• Executive Committees whose term of office had expired; 
• Lack of business management skills; 
• Conflicts amongst the membership; 
• Contestations between CPAs and traditional leaders in some land reform settings.  
A turnaround strategy was initiated in 2010, involving the ‘regularisation’ of 100 complex CPAs through 
the Land Rights Management Facility (LRMF). Lack of capacity to carry out core functions within DRDLR 
had led to the establishment of the LRMF, which draws on a panel of lawyers and mediators to help 
regularise CPAs. However, the process of regularisation envisaged by the LRMF has a very narrow remit. 
This focuses on ensuring that the barest minima of legal compliance with the Act: the holding of an annual 
general meeting, the preparation of reports and financial statements and their submission to the 
Department.  
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However, problems within CPAs are deeper and more systemic than the LRMF processes allow for. They 
require institutional capacity to be developed and supported over a long period of time. This must ensure 
that CPIs:  
• are able to clarify on what basis membership is allocated – to individuals or households; 
• have membership records;  
• have the capacity to ensure that these records are regularly updated; 
• can manage disputes that may arise with respect to the allocation of rights in land for residential 
stands, business premises, community facilities, arable allotments, grazing land, access to natural 
resources, water rights etc.  
From a legal perspective the membership register is central to all aspects of CPI operations, reporting, 
decision-making and benefit sharing. In the absence of state support, very few CPAs have the capacity to 
maintain this register, with the result that there may be conflict and disputes over who is a member and 
what the individual rights of members entail. 
Frequently there is insufficient clarity provided in the CPA Constitution regarding resource access, land 
allocation and management at household/individual membership scale. In most CPAs there are no land 
rights management structures and systems in place and no meaningful support from the state for this 
function. Often where land is utilised there has been informal transfers of rights, or appropriation of land 
and other resources by the powerful. 
It is difficult to generalise about CPI functions because there is a wide variety of operational settings and 
many variations on the three scenarios listed in the table below. 
Table 3: CPAs - diverse scales and operational settings 
CPAs: diverse scales and operational settings 
CPI has a relatively small 
reasonably socially homogenous 
group of members who obtained 
land through a legacy 
redistribution grant (SLAG or LRAD) 
who live offsite, but make use land 
for grazing and cropping.  
The CPI holds the land, controls 
access to the land and takes 
responsibility for maintaining on 
farm infrastructure and accessing 
state support.  
The CPI obtains land through the 
restitution programme. 
Membership is stratified. A portion 
of the membership usually older, 
poorer and more vulnerable 
members may return to restored 
land to live on site.  
Other better off and economically 
active households continue to live 
offsite but may make use of land or 
claim a share of land-based 
resources to augment their 
livelihoods.  
A mix of commercial production 
and livelihood augmentation 
activities take place on an 
individual, group or partnership 
basis.  
The CPI obtains land through the 
restitution programme. CPI 
membership is large and highly 
stratified.  
The landholding entity manages 
the membership lists and fulfils its 
responsibilities in terms of the 
legislation. It reaches agreement 
with the membership to establish 
other legal entities such as a trust 
or an operating company to plan 
and manage capital and skills 
intensive enterprises or enter into 
partnership arrangements.  
Other land may be allocated to 
members for individual grazing and 
cultivation. 
 
Organisations like Vumelana argue that the function of the CPA is to hold land on behalf of its members 
and that most problems and conflicts which CPAs have experienced, surface when they try to assume the 
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functions of an operating entity, responsible for running a business as well.  Where CPIs acquire land with 
high value going concerns such as orchards or vineyards, (usually through Restitution) they need to 
establish another vehicle/legal entity to operate the businesses. However, this is frequently where conflict 
and power struggles arise. The structuring of the relationship between the CPA and the operating entity 
is complex and presents a range of social risks. The financial and business management functions assumed 
by the operating entity may create dependence on an external entity or strategic partner, which may also 
absorb the majority share of any profits. This may contradict the expectations of members and cause 
discontent. At the same time, these arrangements may create opportunities for elite pacts, corruption 
and misappropriation of resources. Strong and independent oversight mechanisms are required to 
prevent this from taking place.  
3.6.4 The absence of systems enabling the registration and administration of land and related 
resource rights 
in addition to the many difficulties faced by individual CPIs set out above, there is a further and more 
fundamental external problem - how to register, legally secure and enable transactions, linked to rights 
that may be granted to individuals who are members of such entities.  
Even where a CPI may have sufficiently worked out tenure systems and land 
management structures and systems in place, there is nowhere, other than in the 
CPIs own systems that such rights may be registered - none of the relevant Acts 
require or provide for the registration of such rights to property.  These rights are 
essentially off-register and extremely insecure - dependent on the internal capability 
and power dynamics within each of these CPIs.(Manona, Kingwill et al. 2018: 47) 
3.6.5 Municipal Commonage 
The 1997 White Paper on Land Policy emphasised the importance of municipal commonage as a means 
to provide access to land the poor residents in rural towns and settlements. It distinguished between 
traditional commonage which specified public benefit conditions in its title deed and newly acquired 
commonage land, either independently by municipalities or through land reform programme.  
With respect to traditional commonage land “it became standard practice to regulate access to the 
commonage of a village in terms of municipal by-laws. As a rule, each village council adopted a set of 
prescribed standard by-laws to determine the content and nature of user rights, to provide for the 
allocation and ongoing administration of such rights, and to provide for the maintenance of the 
commonage”(Anderson and Pienaar 2003 p. 3). 
By 2003 new commonage accounted for 31% of the total land transferred through the land reform 
programme, although 74% of commonage land was transferred in Namaqualand (Anderson and Pienaar 
2003). At the same time interventions were made to expand access of smallholder livestock owners to 
traditional commonage held by municipalities prior to 1994 which had been almost exclusively leased 
out to white farmers.  
Municipal commonage was characterised by land reform review commissioned in 1999 as an 
underperforming programme with regard to post transfer land use and management. Despite issuing a 
detailed commonage policy and operational manual in 2002 DLA and allocated minimal funds for the 
allocation of commonage land going forward. Land reform funds were rather allocated to the acquisition 
of land through the LRAD programme. 
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Anderson and Pienaar (2003) note that available data indicated that commonage users were 
predominantly men and that a number of factors including distance to the newly acquired commonage 
lands frequently limited the access of women to commonage resources. Also, in the vast majority of 
instances commonage land is allocated for grazing only. They identify diverse range of commonage 
users, often in competition with each other to gain the rights to graze their stock including “strong 
farmers and resource-poor farmers; commercial, part-time, income-supplementing and subsistence 
farmers; middle-class residents with additional stock investments, poor inkommers from the farms and 
migrant workers using the commonage to ‘bank’ income” (2003: 11).  
Commonage management is reported to have collapsed in many instances, despite there being long 
recorded histories of commonage management and documented regulations and practices. Anderson 
and Pienaar highlight several examples of commonage land which has degenerated into an open access 
resource, where essential infrastructure such as fencing, grazing camps and water points are no longer 
maintained. In these instances, the municipalities have lacked capacity to institute grazing agreements, 
collect grazing fees and maintain commonage infrastructure together with commonage users. 
The result has been self-help, dominance and exclusion of women and the poor, non-
payment of user-fees, land degradation and severely reduced or minimal benefit to 
the few who manage to gain access. (Ibid: 13) 
Despite this pessimistic assessment Atkinson (2013) notes that commonage farming remains 
widespread. She estimates that there are 2400 commonage farmers in the Free State alone, based on 
the estimate of 30 farmers per town across 80 towns in the province. She argues that: 
Many commonage farmers are starting to behave like commercial farmers, even 
though they use municipal (state-owned) land. They often use other income sources 
to purchase inputs for their farming operations, showing a desire to invest in 
agriculture. They sometimes employ herders, thus creating jobs. Commonage is not 
used only by the poor, and certainly not only by men. Women participate fully as 
commonage farmers.(Atkinson 2013: 30) 
Atkinson identifies pilot commonage schemes in the Free State where there has been improved levels of 
institutional support by the municipality and technical assistance provided by the Department of 
Agriculture. In these instances, it appears that the municipality has developed capacity to ensure that 
grazing agreements are in place, and fees are paid. She argues that these arrangements greatly assist 
commonage farmers, despite the higher rental payments being levied. 
She advances a strong argument against one size fits all, standardised policy approaches, highlighting 
the need for a “very nuanced policy framework, variously catering for survivalist, small-scale, large-scale 
full-time and part-time farming; on government land, private land municipal land or communal land”. 
This needs to offer a range of user rights ranging from leasehold to ownership backed by appropriate 
institutional support. She argues that “the key challenges are institutional capacity, not the choice of 
specific property regimes” (Ibid: 33). 
It seems clear that commonage does provide livelihood opportunities for the residents who own 
livestock and live in rural towns. However, this is a resource, which like anything else can be captured by 
elites and degenerate into the dystopian scenarios sketched by Anderson and Pienaar above. It is clear 
that in the commonage context, leasehold is the tenure form which enables access to the land. It is 
institutional capacity which will determine whether lease agreements are issued, and the terms of the 
leases enforced so as to secure a revenue stream to maintain essential infrastructure on the land. 
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3.6.6 Labour tenants 
Labour tenant relations no longer exist. However labour tenancy was at the heart of struggles for land 
and tenure security which have extended for more than a century. The Land Reform Labour Tenants Act 
(No. 3 of 1996) seeks to protect the rights of labour tenants living on land owned by others but who 
have, or had, the right to use cropping or grazing land on a farm in exchange for their labour. Most 
labour tenants are found in KwaZulu–Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces. 
As colonial control extended over South Africa in the 1800s, settlers demarcated farms and Roman 
Dutch property law was extended over much land which Africans had occupied for generations. Those 
who had enjoyed ownership in terms of customary law retained occupancy but lost control over their 
land. 
They were forced to comprehend how a piece of paper in the form of a title deed 
lodged in some distant bureaucratic office could deprive them of the land that they 
were born on, and where their ancestors were buried. (Cowling, Hornby et al. 2017: 
3) 
Their rights were diminished to those of occupiers, whose continuing access to and use of the land was 
at discretion of the new owners with registered title. 
….by 1913, Africans had been effectively dispossessed of their de facto ownership. 
Those who wanted to access productive land were compelled to enter labour tenancy 
contracts. The contracts involved the patriarchal head of house entering agreements 
with white landowners to provide the labour of his children and his wives for free, in 
return for which he was provided land to build a home on, fields to plant crops on and 
grazing land for livestock. When farmers argue today that they make an important 
contribution to the country’s economy, that food security for the growing cities 
depends on them, it is fitting to recall that the unpaid labour of children and women 
is inextricably woven into, and is the bedrock of what is today “the farm”. (Hornby 
2018 n.p)  
Labour tenants retained their rights to stay on the farm and to graze and cultivate a portion of land in 
exchange for providing mostly free labour to the registered owners. 
Over the years the state made numerous attempts to restrict and then abolish labour tenancy so as to 
transform labour tenants into wage labourers with no rights in land. However, these were unsuccessful 
because labour tenancy was perceived as providing benefits to farmers — particularly those who had 
yet to transition to more mechanised and labour-lean farming systems. 
As state support for labour tenancy was withdrawn there was nothing in law to regulate relations 
between owners and tenants. This placed tenants at risk of having their historical rights diluted, or of 
being evicted from their land. 
It was estimated that by the end of the 1980s, there were around half a million individuals operating 
within some sort of labour tenant system, “with some form of occasional wages in light of the official 
illegality of the system” (Cowling. M. et al. 2017: 5) 
The Land Reform Labour Tenants Act (No. 3 of 1996) was passed to protect the occupational and land 
use rights of labour tenants as they existed on and after 2 June 1995. The Act provides a complex 
definition of a labour tenant and its interpretation has since been the subject of legal dispute. Section 
(xi) states: 
       
45 
 
“labour tenant” means a person 
(a) who is residing or has the right to reside on a farm; 
(b) who has or has had the right to use cropping or grazing land on the farm, referred 
to in paragraph (a), or another farm of the owner, and in consideration of such right 
provides or has provided labour to the owner or lessee; and 
(c) whose parent or grandparent resided or resides on a farm and had the use of 
cropping or grazing land on such farm or another farm of the owner, and in 
consideration of such right provided or provides labour to the owner or lessee of such 
or such other farm, including a person who has been appointed a successor to a 
labour tenant in accordance with the provisions of section 3(4) and (5), but excluding 
a farmworker. 
In trying to resolve labour tenant cases it has been disputed whether all three subsections of the 
definition must apply simultaneously, as this would exclude all first-generation labour tenants whose 
grandparents did not reside on the farm. 
Likewise, any person otherwise qualifying as a labour tenant, but who had subsequently been paid a 
wage as a farmworker could also be disqualified in terms of the Act. This ambiguity encouraged 
landowners to make payments to convert tenants into wage workers, so as to undermine the possibility 
of labour tenant claims on the property. 
To further complicate matters, there are cases of conflicting and overlapping labour tenant and 
restitution claims on the same property. In practice, restitution claims of those forcibly removed in the 
past have tended to be given priority, to the detriment of those labour tenant claimants who still reside 
on the land. This creates an impossible situation and heightens the possibility of conflict between 
restitution and labour tenant claimants. Research submitted to the HLP argued that labour tenant claims 
should be given precedence. 
Despite the Act containing measures to prevent eviction of labour tenants and to criminalise owners 
guilty of illegal eviction, there is little evidence that the Act has been effective in preventing eviction. 
This in part is due to the ambiguities in the LTA definition, where labour tenants may be passed off as 
farmworkers. 
A person who has narrowly missed out on being defined as a labour tenant could end 
up simultaneously losing their job, and would also render him or herself liable to be 
evicted from the only place that they can call home. The law as it currently stands 
does nothing to offer any form of protection in such circumstances.  (Cowling, M. et al 
2017: 14). 
Chapter 3 of the LTA enabled labour tenants to apply to obtain ownership of land where they could 
show historical use and occupation rights. The deadline for these applications closed on 31 March 2001. 
Some 20 324 applications were lodged by the deadline. But since then very few claims have been 
processed or settled. The Act has a fatal flaw in that it placed the Department at the centre of the claims 
process. Section 17 of the Act requires that any application for the acquisition of land and servitudes (to 
provide access to water, rights of way, etc) had to be lodged with the Director General. The drafters of 
the Act assumed that the Department would have adequate capacity to process these applications 
which was not the case. The failure to respond has meant that “in labour tenant litigation both the 
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labour tenant and the landowner can be held to ransom by the Director-General, whose non-compliance 
results in a breakdown of the entire process” (Cowling, M. et al. 2017: 15). 
The Department of Land Affairs failed to allocate the necessary staff to implement the Act and process 
the claims. Institutional incapacity has meant that thousands of labour tenant claims vanished without 
trace. In the seventeen years which has passed since claims were submitted, many of the labour tenant 
claimants have died. The Department unilaterally sought to address some labour tenant claims via the 
redistribution programme. 
Perspectives from the HLP report on the LTA 
A review of the implementation of the LTA commissioned for the High Level Panel found that there have 
been significant problems in implementing the Act. 
Progress has been stalled by the conflictual nature of court proceedings. The report confirmed the 
failure to allocate adequate resources for implementation. Despite there being an emphasis on 
alternative dispute resolution methods to settle labour tenant claims (similar to conciliation processes 
to address disputes in terms of the Labour Relations Act) this was not the approach in practice. 
AFRA class action and the Constitutional Court ruling 
The failure of the DRDLR to carry out its constitutional mandate has been the subject of a class action 
brought the Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) – a long established land sector NGO. On 8 
December 2016, Judge AJ Ncube of the Land Claims Court ruled that the Department was in breach of its 
constitutional obligations and ordered that a Special Master of Labour Tenants be appointed to process 
claims. The judgement required the Special Master to report to the Court on progress. 
The DRDLR was subsequently granted leave to appeal this judgment to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) in 2016, arguing that the appointment of a Special Master violated the principle of the separation 
of powers. The SCA overturned the Labour Claims Court’s appointment of a special master, citing a 
“textbook case of judicial overreach” (Postman and Wicomb 2019: n.p.). The case was then referred on 
appeal to the Constitutional Court. In August 2019 a majority of judges in the court upheld the Land 
Claims Court’s (LCC) order to appoint a Special Master to assist the Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform to process land claims. 
This new development will turn attention to the ways in which the tenure of successful labour tenant 
claims can be secured and how land obtained through the claims process will be held.  
3.6.7 Farm workers and dwellers 
The tenure security of farm workers and dwellers have been made ever more precarious by rapid 
changes in the local and global agricultural policy and markets. In South Africa state expenditure on 
agriculture began to decline in the mid-1980s. Between 1987 and 1993, budgetary allocations to the 
white commercial farming sector were halved. South Africa’s admission into the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993 accelerated the economic deregulation and liberalisation of agriculture. 
South African agriculture now operates under very different circumstances… Since 
1994, South African agriculture has moved from being heavily protected by state 
subsidies and tariff barriers to being exposed to global competition… [in which] South 
African subsidies are now among the lowest in the world. (Atkinson 2007: n.p.) 
These processes brought about deep structural changes in the sector. Large scale intensive farms 
dominated, focusing on the production of high-value products for export, as opposed to low-value, high-
volume commodities for domestic markets (WWF 2009) 
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Farmworkers still remained unprotected by any form of central labour legislation by the early 1990s. 
Employment contracts with farmers were governed by common law, so farmers could retrench and evict 
farmworkers at will.  
During the first decade of democracy in South Africa new policy and legislation was introduced to 
regulate labour relations and conditions of employment, address land reform, housing and tenure 
security for farm workers. Key legislation included: 
• The Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995); 
• The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (No. 75 of 1997); 
• The Unemployment Insurance Act (No. 63 of 2001); 
• The Employment Equity Act (No. 55 of 1998); 
• The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (No. 3 of 1996); 
• The Extension of Security of Tenure Act (No. 62 of 1997); 
• The Housing Act (No. 107 of 1997). (ILO 2015). 
While new policies and laws aimed to improve the lives of farmworkers, prevent arbitrary eviction and 
secure their rights, the process of re-regulation had many unintended consequences. 
Wegerif et al (2005) estimate that there were approximately 4.3 million black Africans living on white 
farms in 1984. Between 1985 and 1995 they calculate that more than three quarters of a million people 
were evicted or displaced from farms throughout South Africa. According to their data, evictions spiked 
in 1992 (179 575 people evicted) linked to severe drought and associated layoffs on farms, and again in 
1994 (122 626 people evicted) which they attribute to the promulgation of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act and general uncertainty among employers associated with the trajectory of the transition to 
democracy.  
Policies to raise worker wages and protect tenure rights were introduced at the same time as producers 
that were seeking to access highly competitive export markets faced expanded compliance 
responsibilities. By 2002 just 673 farms (1.6% of the total number of commercial farms) produced a third 
of total gross farm income, and 1 348 farms (5% of the total) produced more than half of total gross 
farm income (Vink and Van Rooyen 2009). 
 The slashing of state support for agriculture left many producers with little alternative but to cut costs. 
In this context, new policies and laws: 
• created disincentives for commercial producers to provide and maintain on-farm housing; 
• contributed to the further displacement/eviction of low skilled workers; 
• accelerated the casualisation and externalization of large segments of the agricultural 
workforce. 
Nkuzi Development Association has argued that the biggest weakness in ESTA “has been the failure of 
the Act to move farm dwellers out of an inferior tenancy arrangement to a situation of having their own 
land”.  
Nkuzi notes that: 
Section 4 of ESTA empowers the Minister to appropriate funds for “on-site and off-
site developments.” However, the provisions of Section 4 make it very difficult to 
force an on-site settlement where the owner is unwilling and there is no right in the 
legislation for a farm dweller to claim security of tenure if the government is failing to 
provide it for them. (Nkuzi Development Association n.d) 
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A follow up report to hearings held by the South African Human Rights Commission in 2003 recorded 
that just 273 people had benefitted from the award of Section 4 subsidies – mostly in Gauteng. 
In 2007 the SAHRC held follow up hearings to determine the progress made in relation to land tenure 
security, safety and labour relations on farms. The report highlighted how ESTA had impacted on secure 
access to housing for farm workers.  
ESTA has had unintended and undesirable consequences…Attempting to privilege 
tenure security in isolation from a larger development programme to address living 
and working conditions on farms, has practically extinguished many of the other 
rights of farm dwellers and their families – such as the rights to adequate housing, 
health and education… It provides a disincentive to land owners and employers to 
improve on farm housing and facilities. (South African Human Rights Commission 
2008: 9) 
In the 2011 Green Paper on Land Reform the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
acknowledged that the implementation of ESTA has been overwhelmed by “total system failure”.  
There is a strong view that the real problem in land reform in general; and, in the 
protection of the rights and security of tenure of farm-dwellers, in particular, may be 
that of a total-system failure (TSF) rather than that of a single piece of legislation, 
e.g., Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA). (DRDLR 2011: 10) 
The HLP and the Presidential Advisory Panel highlights the continued vulnerability of farmworkers and 
dwellers and the increasing number of evictions, noting that farm dwellers tenure remains “a poor 
relation within land reform policy”. The report recognises however that calling for a moratorium on 
evictions poses constitutional and legal problems. It follows the recommendations of the HLP to 
properly enforce Section 4 of ESTA and enable processes by which farmworkers can register to secure 
access to their own land and obtain security of tenure. 
The 1997 the White Paper on South African Land Policy alluded to above restricted those eligible to 
benefit from land reform to:  
• verified claimants of the Land Restitution Programme in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act, 22 of 1994, who require additional funds for meeting basic needs on restored land;  
• landless people, or people who have limited access to land, especially women, who wish to gain 
access to land and settlement opportunities in rural or urban areas;  
• farm workers and their families who wish to acquire land and improve their settlement and 
tenure conditions;  
• labour tenants, and their families, who wish to acquire and improve the land which they hold or 
alternative land, in accordance with the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 3 of 1996;  
• residents who wish to secure and upgrade the conditions of tenure under which they live;  
• Municipal Councils to acquire land to be used as a commonage or to extend an existing 
commonage. 3 
Despite the stated objectives of the White Paper, farm workers have not been priority beneficiaries of 
land reform. Indeed, they have hardly benefitted from land reform at all. The policy focus with regard to 
farmworkers is primarily focused on attempts to secure tenure and prevent arbitrary eviction. However, 
 
3 DLA (1997). White Paper on South African Land Policy. Pretoria, Department of Land Affairs. 
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even where this may be successful, security of tenure without the means to make a livelihood condemn 
farm dwellers to a marginal existence. 
Research undertaken by PLAAS in Limpopo highlights how rapid change in the agricultural sector has 
progressively undermined the position of farmworkers and dwellers. These changes included rapid 
mechanisation and export led development and an increasing reliance on short contract seasonal 
labour.  
There appears to be very little information available on the extent to which people living and working on 
farms desire to farm on their own account. 
Simbi and Aliber (2000) undertook a survey which they asked farmworkers and dwellers in Dendron and 
Tzaneen whether they would wish farm for themselves. They found that workers who had not taken on 
specialised functions on the farm were more likely to be confident that they could make use of their 
general farming skills if the opportunity to farm independently arose. Where workers had taken on 
particular functions such as the repair of machinery, they were less certain of their abilities to farm on 
their own. Aspirations range from the desire to farm commercially to more modest goals of obtaining a 
plot to grow additional food for the family. There appears to be very little data available on the extent to 
which workers employed in the agricultural sector have access to land on the farms where they are 
employed and are encouraged to become involved in production for household food security or enabled 
to piggyback on existing systems to access markets. 
The recent ILO report has signalled that attention needs to be paid on how to address the 
developmental challenge of securing homes, livelihoods and access to services for farmworkers both on 
farm. The report notes that “although there are examples of off-farm schemes to provide secure 
housing and livelihoods for former farm dwellers these have been the exception”(ILO 2015:  84). 
4 Relative security of land rights and implications for  
small scale producers/smallholder farmers in different settings 
The table below summarises the relative security of land rights in different settings across the landscape 
and what these mean for smallholder farmers.  
Table 4: Relative security of land rights in different settings 
Tenure setting Relative security of land rights Implications for smallholders and 
rights holders 
Former bantustans The PTO and quitrent systems have 
broken down. This affects 17 
million people living in the former 
bantustan areas. There is no 
mechanism in place to record 
rights in land and to adjudicate 
conflicting and overlapping rights. 
Spatial planning, development 
control and land use regulatory 
measures are non-functional. Ad 
hoc site allocations are the norm. 
Households at risk of arbitrary 
dispossession or encroachment on 
land and resource entitlements. 
Management of common property 
People may be dispossessed of 
their rights in land through land 
grabs and elite deals between 
chiefs, traditional councils and 
external investors such as mining 
houses and agribusinesses. 
The breakdown in land governance 
and administration has contributed 
to the decline of the smallholder 
arable production as there are no 
controls on where livestock may 
graze. 
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Tenure setting Relative security of land rights Implications for smallholders and 
rights holders 
resources has declined in most 
instances. In some contexts, it has 
degenerated into open access 
which in favours capture by elites. 
IPILRA, the protective legislation is 
a temporary and renewed 
annually. It contains provisions to 
ensure that rights holders may not 
be dispossessed of their land 
without their consent. These 
provisions are not widely known or 
utilised. The Act has been poorly 
implemented and current draft 
legislation such as the TKLB seeks 
to further dilute IPILRA’s protective 
capacity. 
Arable land may be encroached on 
or reallocated for residential 
stands. 
Land with water and high 
productive value remains 
underutilised. Despite investment 
in revitalising irrigation schemes, 
many remain non -functional. 
Ingonyama Trust Land that people have lived on for 
generations has been converted to 
leasehold under the Ingonyama 
trust and occupiers are forced to 
pay rents. 
Evidence suggests that women’s 
land rights are particularly 
vulnerable under the Ingonyama 
Trust 
The Trust operates with impunity 
and disregards the protections and 
requirements of prior informed 
consent contained within IPILRA. 
Rights holders are reduced to 
tenancy on their own land. 
Additional disincentives to develop 
agricultural resources. 
Increasing incidence of traditional 
authorities abusing their powers of 
self-stated custodianship over 
customary rights.  
Lack of agency by land rights 
holders over customary lands 
where mining rights or other rights 
of natural resource extraction are 
authorised, or may be authorised 
in spite of protections in law.  
Act 9/TRANCRAA Rural Areas Land rights in the TRANCRAA areas 
remain in something of a vacuum 
as the transformation process 
which was supposed to be set in 
motion by TRANCRAA has 
experienced long process delays 
due to the incapacity of DRDLR.  
TRANCRAA creates options for land 
to held by municipalities or CPAs. 
In both instances institutional 
incapacity poses a threat to land 
administration, maintenance of 
infrastructure and creates 
opportunities for resource capture. 
TRANCRAA communities are 
geographically delimited and have 
long settlement and land use 
histories. This provides some 
protection against arbitrary loss of 
land rights, although there is 
evidence of attempts by local elites 
to gain access to disproportionate 
allocations of grazing and arable 
land.  
The failure to implement 
TRANCRAA has opened space for 
informal allocations of land which 
put the rights of more vulnerable 
households at risk.  
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Tenure setting Relative security of land rights Implications for smallholders and 
rights holders 
Inability to collect grazing fees 
threatens maintenance of essential 
infrastructure on the land  
 
Land acquired through community 
restitution claims 
Restored land is held by a CPA or a 
Trust. Relative security of land 
rights and/or benefit sharing varies 
widely. Some claims have a 
settlement component, while 
others make claimants who remain 
offsite the equivalent of 
shareholders in enterprises 
managed on their behalf – often by 
a third party.  
Very few landholding entities 
owning rural land restored through 
community claims have had the 
capacity to determine individual 
household rights in land, beyond 
the allocation residential erven.  
Where land claims have a 
significant settlement component a 
township establishment process 
may be initiated which gives the 
local municipality responsibility for 
service provision.  
High levels of indigency and costs 
of providing services to remote 
settlements places a strain on 
municipal finances   
Land and benefit sharing rights of 
households joined in a community 
claim remain unspecified in most 
instances. Household 
responsibilities to contribute to 
asset maintenance are also not 
addressed. 
The size of many community claims 
creates spaces for resource capture 
by powerful figures and elites, 
leading to further dispossession of 
claimant households. 
Restitution has not created many 
opportunities for smallholders with 
the exception of the sugar and 
forestry industries, although there 
are numerous concerns about the 
sustainability of smallholder 
production in the sugar sector. 
Land transferred to land holding 
entities established through SLAG 
In the first phase of land reform 
land was transferred to Trusts and 
CPAs in ownership. Many of the 
landholdings transferred could not 
meet the livelihood needs of 
members of the CPA/beneficiaries 
of the Trust. Many projects 
collapsed. In some instances, 
properties were abandoned or 
retained by a small core of residual 
members. Poor oversight of Trusts 
and CPAs resulted in elites selling 
off land and assets without the 
consent of members 
No provision was made to identify 
rights of individual rights holders 
making up the membership of CPAs 
and Trusts.  
There was an emphasis on whole 
farm operation and group 
enterprise management which 
failed. 
Where properties have not been 
abandoned, or their assets stripped 
there may be potential for 
turnaround involving individual 
subdivision. 
       
52 
 
Tenure setting Relative security of land rights Implications for smallholders and 
rights holders 
Land transferred to land holding 
entities established through LRAD 
There is little data currently 
available which enables an 
assessment of the sustainability of 
properties transferred through 
LRAD.  
However, given that this 
programme consciously set out to 
restrict the number of beneficiaries 
and to require an own 
contribution, property ownership 
vested in small groups, families and 
individuals.  
In a family farming context rights in 
land were relatively easy to 
determine, although given high 
transaction costs to transfer title, 
informal transfers of land may take 
place.  
Land in individual or family 
ownership could be ceded as 
collateral against production loans.  
Where family farming enterprises 
failed and entities were forced to 
declare bankruptcy, their land and 
other assets could be liquidated to 
cover their debts. 
Land acquired through PLAS Research indicates that many of 
the occupiers of the more than 
2200 farms purchased through this 
programme do not have leases and 
are not paying the prescribed 5% of 
annual turnover.  
Rights in this setting are highly 
insecure and subject to the whims 
of the state which may allocate the 
property to other 
applicants/associates/cronies at 
will 
There are strong disincentives for 
smallholders to invest in such an 
uncertain land rights context.  
There are also perverse incentives 
to asset strip properties purchased 
through this programme in a 
context where the state lacks 
oversight capacity and political will 
to manage state land assets. 
Farm workers and dwellers The tenure of farmworkers and 
dwellers is structurally insecure 
because they live on land owned by 
others.  
The Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act regulates the rights of owners 
and occupiers and specifies the 
circumstances under which an 
owner may apply to evict and 
occupier.  
While legal evictions do take place, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that 
many owners induce occupiers to 
leave properties by means of once 
off cash payments and relinquish 
their ESTA rights in the process. 
It is unclear to what extent 
farmworkers and dwellers are 
involved in independent 
agricultural activity – whether this 
be in the form of home gardens, 
the allocation of land by the owner 
to enable cultivation or grazing. 
Whatever the case, the rights of 
farmworkers and dwellers to make 
use of this land, where it may be 
granted, remains dependent on 
their continued employment or 
ongoing good relationship with the 
landowner. 
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Tenure setting Relative security of land rights Implications for smallholders and 
rights holders 
There has been little use of section 
4 of the act which makes provision 
for on and off farm settlement and 
the award of tenure grants. 
Labour tenants Given the long-standing failure of 
the state to implement the Land 
Reform Labour Tenants Act, the 
land rights of many labour tenants 
have remained highly precarious.  
Landowners have often sought to 
make payments to them to 
establish contractual relations as 
farmworkers in a bid to extinguish 
labour tenancy agreements and 
the right of access to land grazing 
that these confer.  
Where Labour tenants claims that 
been lodged Labour tenants are at 
high risk of eviction. 
The recent decision by the 
Constitutional Court to require the 
Department of Agriculture, Land 
Reform and Rural Development to 
appoint a special Master to 
develop a plan for the processing 
of long outstanding labour tenant 
claims may create opportunities for 
labour tenants to gain access to 
land in their own right, creating 
potential for smallholder 
production. 
Commonage users Research suggests that in many 
instances commonage 
management has collapsed and 
that much of the land allocated to 
commonage is being grazed 
without planning oversight or 
development control. Grazing 
rights in this setting remain 
insecure. 
Commonage creates opportunities 
for small and medium livestock 
owners to graze their stock. 
However, the absence of 
commonage management and the 
running down of essential water 
and fencing infrastructure may 
serve to limit production potential.  
Given that majority of livestock 
owners grazing on commonage 
land sell livestock on informal 
markets, there is little data 
available to assess the social and 
economic value of these 
enterprises. 
 
It can be seen from the table above that smallholder producers across the landscape almost uniformly 
experienced significant levels of tenure insecurity which impacts on their productive potential. It can 
also be seen that there will be no benefits from one size fits all attempts at finding a solution. 
Strengthening tenure security will have a strong element of contextual specificity and will require 
nuanced and customised approaches appropriate to different tenure settings. 
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5 Land administration in different settings 
5.1 Tenure security and smallholder production in communal areas 
Is tenure a major factor influencing household involvement in agricultural production in the communal 
areas? How do the communal tenure regimes constrain or enlarge land-based/land linked livelihood 
opportunities and for who?  
The section above highlights how agricultural production in the former homelands has changed with 
much arable production being restricted to fenced garden plots adjacent to people’s homes. This has 
meant that much arable land has been returned to grazing and forms part of an expanded portfolio of 
grazing and other common property resources. It has been argued convincingly that natural resources 
(fuelwood, wild foods, building materials, medicinal products) make an important contribution to daily 
living and income generation and mitigate against income and asset poverty.(Shackleton, Shackleton et 
al. 2000, Shackleton, Shackleton et al. 2007, Shackleton, Campbell et al. 2008) 
Use of such biological resources typically provides 15 to 25% of total income to rural 
households in South Africa, and for many households surpasses income from arable 
cropping and livestock combined. (Shackleton and Shackleton 2012: 1) 
Importantly much of this income benefits women in vulnerable households. It is important to recognise 
that communal tenure regimes even where poorly supported and managed still provide essential safety 
nets for poor households. This has often been overlooked in the debate about how to bring 
underutilised land back into production the communal areas. 
There is also research which examines cases of how the reinstatement of customary rules to reinforce 
exclusive rights to arable land have improved perceptions of tenure security and prevented damage to 
crops from the invasion of livestock. Research conducted in the Tugela catchment (Thomson 1996) 
asked the question why despite intense population pressure and acute poverty arable land was left idle 
in KwaZulu. The hypothesis was that there was no rental market to enable unused arable land to be 
utilised by others who could farm it. Such a rental market was only enabled once the tribal authority 
agreed to uphold rental contracts in customary courts and to set up a local oversight committee to 
agree on a planting date after which all livestock had to be removed from arable lands. The committee 
developed procedures for settling disputes and established rates of compensation to be paid in cases 
where livestock damaged or destroyed crops. 
Others have argued that land rights will need to be privatised and individualised before land markets 
can be created and abandoned lands brought back into production. There has been heated debate on 
the merits and demerits of issuing title deeds for whose rights remain off register, and whether such a 
move would actually be socially and economically beneficial.  
Kingwill has argued convincingly that the issuing of title deeds is unlikely to provide solutions and is 
much more likely to produce a range of unintended and undesirable outcomes. She highlights the lack of 
fit between neatly individualised and ‘parcellised’ conceptions of property and nested and layered 
African family property constructs. 
The trajectory of the debate in the media and on public forums suggest that the issue 
is deeply polarised and mired in ideological considerations, with an alarming lack of 
understanding by many of the actual verifiable conditions on the ground… 
Individuals, families and community members hold a range of primary and secondary 
rights that are often layered, over each other. The human – land relationships are 
usually not one-to-one, and thus resist neat parcellisation or subdivision. If the 
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process of untangling these social webs is not conducted with an empathetic yet 
rigorous approach, issuing titles may unwittingly open up concealed cracks and 
trigger disputes for generations to come. (Kingwill 2018: n.p.) 
Kingwill notes that a key characteristic of African family property systems in South Africa is that families 
frequently do not identify an individual within the family who is designated as the registered ‘owner’.  
“Hence title deeds fall rapidly and repeatedly out of date… because family members 
do not wish to record the proprietary relationship alone. This gives power to someone 
in the family to dispose of all, or some of the family’s property unilaterally, a power 
that individual family members are not supposed to have. In the context of poverty, 
family property is an important safety valve to protect vulnerable members of the 
extended family. It is also a powerful symbolic social anchor in times of great 
uncertainty and transition.(Ibid: n.p.) 
Kingwill’s perspective aligns with that of Verdery who examined the process of re-creating of private 
property rights from the legacies of collective property nationalised under communism in the aftermath 
of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. This was a process demanding consideration of a complex array of 
factors: 
First, I suggest that to understand property …, one must go beyond defining it in 
terms of rights and obligations that assume individualised property subjects. I prefer 
instead a property analysis that invokes the total system of social, cultural and 
political relations and enquires into, rather than assuming the nature of property 
conceptions.(Verdery 1999: 103) 
As Verdery suggests, this demands “a deeper enquiry into the very concept of property itself – what it 
means, and how property regimes are socially produced”. This requires that when we examine what is 
known about land-based livelihoods and agricultural production in communal tenure settings we need 
to interrogate how the land is actually held, and the balance of powers, social and economic factors that 
either enhance or constrain its productive use. This calls for tools which assist with the understanding of 
the “intersection of interests and dispositions that serve to maintain complex property rights …(and) 
how these rights are bound up with power relations, with social identities and notions of self, and with 
embeddedness in social networks” (Ibid p. 104).  
5.1.1 Silences on tenure and gender 
Available survey data which examines household food and agricultural production is frequently silent on 
tenure and gender relations. Data identifies ‘households’ whose representatives report that they are 
engaged in food production, but how they access and hold land, where and how this production takes 
place is often unclear.   
Greenberg et al (2018) draw on the 2016 Community Survey to show that around 60% of food-
producing households are found in KZN (23%), Eastern Cape (21%) and Limpopo (17%). Survey data 
confirms that the number of households involved in agricultural production continue to decline 
(Lehohla, 2016:4). This is a trend long identified in the literature: 
Since 1950, Black rural homesteads have increasingly discontinued the cultivation of 
their arable allotments. Recent case studies in the Ciskei region of the Eastern Cape 
showed that only about 10% of the fields were ploughed annually (Hebinck and 
Monde, 2007; De Wet, 2011). At present, crop production occurs mostly in home 
gardens, explaining why farming now only serves as an additional source of food for 
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the large majority of Black households (Vink and Van Rooyen, 2009; Aliber and Hart, 
2009).(Van Averbeke, Denison et al. 2011: 801) 
Case study research and localised surveys confirm that where agriculture is practised in the communal 
areas this is increasingly centred on the homestead. Croplands allocated to many rural households 
frequently lies fallow or has been informally converted to grazing.  
An investigation by Connor and Mtwana (2017: 2) in the Eastern Cape examines the shift away from field 
cultivation to what they describe as “vestige production in gardens”. Importantly, however they anchor 
this activity in the social construction of ‘building the homestead’ (ukwakha umzi)” arguing that 
homestead production functions as one of the markers which indicate “the material, social and moral 
value of the homestead.”  They examine how diversified homestead production contributes to “the ‘glue’ 
in maintaining household integrity and ultimately, agrarian identity”.  
They identify key factors enabling home-based production to contribute to household livelihood security 
and create opportunities for local sales of surplus produce. 
“Smallholder farming, of which garden cultivation is part of, is by no means uniform, and although under 
threat, has also managed to thrive in regions where water, labour and land can be accessed and managed 
in inventive ways”. (Connor and Mtwana 2017:4) 
They highlight how water poverty remains a key constraint, limiting the potential of garden and field 
agriculture, coupled with the lack of fencing and grazing control.  
6 Smallholder farmer perspectives on land tenure and land administration 
it is difficult to accurately assess smallholder farmer perspectives on the impacts of land tenure 
uncertainty and land administration collapse on their production. This will emerge in more detail from 
the four municipality studies once completed. 
Preliminary indications are that in certain settings there is contestation over the security of rights in 
land. Where rights remain undefined, or are insecure space is created for resource capture. The case of 
Schmidtsdrift discussed above, where individual land and resource rights remained unspecified, created 
fertile ground for elite capture. Powerful individuals were able to capitalise on uncertainty to enlarge 
their share of the commons and enclose land for their private benefit. 
The findings of a recent report on elite capture in land redistribution highlights shortcomings in the state 
land lease and disposal policy which underpins the leasing of land through the proactive land acquisition 
strategy. This argues that there is “a need to rethink the leasehold system in land redistribution and 
ensure tenure security” (Mtero, Gumede et al. 2019: 8). The researchers find that “there is a lack of a 
clear pathway and a set of criteria on when and how beneficiary can exercise the option to purchase a 
farm and exit the lease arrangement”. The report highlights the concerns of several farmers over 
perceived weak land rights and tenure insecurity, noting how government officials emphasise that 
access to state land “is not for inheritance” (Ibid: 24). 
The report also notes that uncertainty about land rights provides the space for “state officials to 
withhold leases and recapitalisation in order to elbow out ordinary people to make way for their 
preferred beneficiaries” (Ibid: 34). This gives rise to conflict and people who were originally on the land 
have refused to vacate in favour of the new leaseholder. 
Overall the report highlights a fundamental land administration failure, in that across five provinces 
close to half of the occupiers of farms least in terms of the plus programme had not received long-term 
leases which specify their land rights. In many instances people occupied the land on the basis of loose 
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verbal agreements or interim caretaker arrangements. Often short-term leases which were issued for 
the period of probation envisaged by the PLAS programme have been allowed to lapse and had not 
been renewed.  
Figure 4:Comparative tenure status of 62 farms Mtero et al: 48 
 
Figure 4 above indicates the marked prevalence of properties where the occupiers either had no lease 
with the state, or their lease or caretaker agreement had expired, suggesting a breakdown in land 
administration on land acquired by the state for land reform. 
In all five provinces, farmers raised concerns about how the SL LDP policy is blind to 
the intergenerational aspect of farming. Successive family generations build on and 
invest in farming enterprises across decades. However, this long-term outlook and 
the commitment to farming are greatly undermined by the precariousness of the 
lease system. (Mtero, Gumede et al. 2019: 49) 
The researchers conclude that the lease system has become synonymous with widespread tenure 
insecurity among land reform beneficiaries. They note that the “policy is not being properly and 
consistently implemented”. 
In the Matzikama local municipality study it also became clear that there was no transparent formula for 
calculating and checking the appropriateness of the rent payable in terms of the leased land. In certain 
instances, beneficiaries who had access to irrigation land appeared to be paying less annual rent than 
livestock farmers leasing extensive grazing land. 
6.1 Rights and obligations 
Much of the focus on land administration and tenure security gravitates towards rights of people on the 
land. However, land administration also speaks to responsibilities and obligations of land users. This 
remains one of the particular blind spots with regard to how land is subsequently administered once it 
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has been acquired through land reform. Infrastructure and assets on the land require investment in 
maintenance. This means that individual land users who exercise rights through a CPA for example are 
required to make a contribution to the use and maintenance of these resources. However, the 
acknowledged failure to develop functioning land rights management and administration systems to 
effect (in)formal subdivision, agree and collect user fees threatens to undermine the sustainability of 
production and close off opportunities on land transferred through the programme. This creates the 
expectation that the state will have an ongoing responsibility to maintain and renew infrastructure on 
the properties. 
Beneficiaries acquiring ownership of land through the SLAG, LRAD or restitution programmes are 
entitled to a ten-year exemption on the payment of property rates to the municipality. These rates 
make an important contribution to the municipality’s revenue base for reinvestment in rural 
infrastructure. Accelerated land reform that effectively excises owners and occupiers from the 
obligation to pay rates, and which cannot enforce such payment once the exemption period expires, has 
the effect of placing increasing pressure on already overstretched municipal administrations. 
7 Evaluating current land tenure proposals  
7.1 Key proposals of the High Level Panel 
The HLP report states that “[t]he failure to give legal effect to the tenure security provisions of the 
Constitution has emerged as a foundational issue throughout the Panel process” (HLP 2017: 59). 
The HLP report covers numerous aspects of the failures of land reform, with a great deal of attention 
focused on the weaknesses in securing land tenure rights for those whose tenure is insecure.  
Not since 1986, when the policy of forced removals was abandoned by the apartheid 
government... have rural people been as structurally vulnerable to dispossession as 
they are currently. (High Level Panel 2017: 260) 
The HLP notes that throughout the 20th century there were restrictions on black people owning land. 
Almost all the land set aside for rural reserves under the 1913 Land Act and the 1936 Land Act was held 
in trust by the state. Occupiers of the land were issued Permission to Occupy certificates. After the 
democratic transition and the incorporation of the former “Bantustans” into the nine provinces, 
homeland land administration systems were abandoned and records lost. Today, 17 million South 
Africans live in the former homelands, now referred to as communal areas. The HLP report concedes 
that achieving tenure security for the communal areas in line with the Constitution is very difficult. To 
date the state has failed to address the challenges and develop systems to record and secure people’s 
rights in land. As the people who suffered most from the Land Acts and forced removals, the HLP argued 
that these people “deserve particular protection and redress”. 
The report approaches the problems of tenure insecurity in the context of the legacies of sharply 
differentiated orders of rights and powers over property in post-apartheid South Africa, mirrored in the 
spatially divided landscape and continued vulnerability of the tenure rights of the poor.  
The HLP report highlights the ability of third parties or local power brokers to manipulate customary 
rights on ‘communal’ land.  It notes that the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act of 1996 
(IPILRA) was passed to provide a safety net to give people in communal areas and elsewhere legal 
protection until new tenure reform laws were in place. But those laws were never passed. IPILRA has 
been renewed annually since its promulgation, but it “has been almost universally ignored” (especially 
when it comes to mining rights on communal land).  
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The report notes that contemporary attempts to pass laws relating to communal land tenure have 
boosted powers of traditional leaders, rather than making the tenure rights of community members 
more secure. The HLP found that a Communal Land Tenure Bill announced in 2017 assumes that people 
in the former homelands are tribal subjects (i.e. under the control of a traditional leader), and not equal 
citizens. The HLP doubts that the courts would support this view.  
The HLP found that customary land rights - the rights of those who live on and work the land - are still 
being denied. Meanwhile the powers of traditional leaders have been boosted by the ways in which 
other laws are interpreted and put into practice. In particular, the HLP highlighted the negative effects 
of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) and the Minerals and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (MPRDA). The HLP highlighted that Parliament has failed to pass a law to 
secure tenure rights in communal areas, as required by the Constitution and government has failed to 
enforce the protection of informal land rights as defined in IPILRA. The HLP also highlighted problems 
with traditional councils established through the TLGFA and equivalent laws passed by provincial 
governments. It showed that they have not transformed themselves, as they are required to do under 
the law. Most traditional councils are not legally valid.  
One aspect of the report focuses on the state’s unwillingness to protect customary rights in the face of 
increasing corporate interests in acquiring mineral rights on ‘communal’ land, and the increasing 
incidence of traditional authorities abusing their powers of self-stated custodianship over customary 
rights. There is concern about the lack of agency by communal land rights holders over customary lands 
where mining rights or other rights of natural resource extraction are authorised, or may be authorised 
in spite of protections in law.  
The report draws attention to continued tenure insecurity among rights holders of land that falls outside 
the formal property system (i.e. regulated by Deeds registration system) despite the enactment of an 
interrelated set of land rights laws passed in the 1990s in terms of the Constitution, that apply to distinct 
categories of vulnerable rights: 
• Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (LTA) 3 of 1996; 
• Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 (CPA Act); 
• Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) 31 of 1996; 
• Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) 62 of 1997; 
• Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE) 19 of 1998; 
• Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Land Act (TRANCRAA) 94 of 1998. 
The HLP report states that “[t]he failure to give legal effect to the tenure security provisions of the 
Constitution has emerged as a foundational issue throughout the Panel process” (HLP 2017: 59).  
The idea of strengthening land rights through a system of records or documentation is considered in the 
HLP report to have a powerful potential to elevate these rights to a more positive legal status and 
address or alleviate these complex problems.  
The report covers the problems that have accumulated around the continued insecurity of land rights 
for each category of rights and their associated laws. It makes suggestions regarding possible expansion 
of the law, or amendments for strengthening each law. In addition, the report raises problems around 
the conceptualisation of law regarding communal land rights, which the government intends to enact as 
the Communal Land Rights Act. The report also raises the problems regarding related legislation on 
traditional authorities and their jurisdiction, including a law on traditional courts.  
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The main recommendations relating to land tenure can be divided into two parts – those that focus on 
the rights of people living in the former bantustans, and those that focus on farm workers, dwellers and 
labour tenants. 
7.1.1 Communal areas  
The HLP recommended that:  
• The Communal Land Tenure Bill should be rejected; 
• IPILRA should be respected and enforced by the DRDLR, by mining companies and traditional 
leaders. It should be amended and made permanent; 
• Laws that have been interpreted to aid land grabs (the Traditional leadership and Governance 
Framework Act (TLGFA), the Minerals and petroleum Development Act (MPRDA) and the 
Ingonyama Trust Act (ITA) need to be made explicitly subject to IPILRA; 
o The Ingonyama Trust Act should be repealed (or at least substantially amended) to bring 
KZN in line with national land policy, and secure land tenure for communities and 
residents concerned. 
• A system of land records should be established that takes into account existing nested or 
relative rights. 
7.1.2 Farm workers, dwellers and labour tenants 
Research commissioned by the HLP on tenure security for farm workers drew attention to the analysis in 
the Green paper that the failure to protect farm dwellers rights reflected a ‘’total system failure and 
which required a total system redesign, coupled with effective institutional support and adequate 
funding” (Phuhlisani NPC 2016: 31). HLP recommendations included: 
• The ESTA Amendment Bill should be amended. In its present form, the Bill fails to provide 
sufficient measures to ensure security of tenure for all occupiers; 
• The LTA should be amended to ensure that restitution claims are not prioritised over labour 
tenant claims; 
• ESTA and LTA need to be properly enforced;  
• A National Register of evictions should be set up, to record the off-register rights of those still 
living on farms. It should be tied into a National Register of ALL off-register rights; 
• DRDLR must prepare a comprehensive, properly costed and funded implementation plan for 
the LTA; 
o Parliament should carefully monitor the DRDLR’s progress on implementing the 
LTA. 
 
7.1.3 Land rights recordal and land administration 
A key recommendation in the report is the enactment of a general Land Reform Framework Act and a 
Land Records Act. The HLP report considers the enactment of a Land Records Act as a vital element in 
providing the necessary institutional power to give effect the rights-based tenure laws. The report’s 
strong endorsement of a land recordal system is understood to be a core element in land 
administration.  
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The Land Records Act would be a crucial component of a land administration system 
that provides robust forms of recourse to ordinary people seeking to assert and 
protect their land rights. Designing an integrated land records system as a 
component of a strong land administration system is an ambitious but necessary 
task. Without it, the other components of land reform are unlikely to deliver 
enforceable land rights to beneficiaries. (HLP 2017: 53) 
The concept of a Land Records Act, if contextualised within a restructured land administration system, 
adds a new dimension to the analysis of tenure insecurity by providing a wider angle than legislation 
alone. The grounding of a land records system in land administration implies strengthening land 
governance institutions and restructuring the state apparatus to ensure that all rights recognised in law 
are legally regulated and enforceable. This approach addresses the acute distinctions that persist 
between systems of rights recognition through the formal registry system and newly recognised 
Constitutional rights that suffer from lack of systems of evidence validation, regulation and 
enforcement.  
The continued weaknesses of off-register rights that are covered by protective legislation are attributed 
to fractured land administration institutions that are unable to perform their functions for implementing 
these laws, and thus in the process clarifying, strengthening, managing and enforcing these rights. The 
report makes it clear that these rights remain systemically weak despite the set of laws that protect all 
categories of vulnerable rights. This implies that despite these rights being visible in law, they continue 
to suffer from lack of systems of verification, conflict resolution and enforcement. The HLP report is 
explicit in this regard: 
Legislative and policy frameworks have so far been ineffective at reflecting and 
recording the nature of the customary and de facto land rights that exist in practice 
for most South Africans. There has been a failure to fulfil the promise in Section 25(6) 
of the Constitution that people whose tenure is legally insecure as a result of past 
discrimination obtain secure rights to the land which they hold on the basis of 
customary law and socially legitimate everyday practices. (HLP 2017: 226) … 
[D]espite the constitutional requirements of Section 25(6), implementation of tenure 
reform laws has been weak and ineffective (HLP 2017: 471). 
The idea of rights ‘recordal’ is presented as a critical intervention to secure protected rights given their 
increasing vulnerability. However, the report accepts the conclusion from evidence presented in backing 
submissions that a focus on the registration of off-register rights alone will not be sufficient to solve the 
problem of vulnerability.  
However, it has been argued out that most of the rights embedded in off-register tenure arrangements 
are, by their nature, not registerable. South Africa has a stringent and uncompromising system of spatial 
and legal conditions for registering rights and most of the rights that are not registered would not easily 
qualify (Phuhlisani NPC 2016: 66-70, 75, 79). This does not stop efforts to register them nonetheless, but 
evidence reveals that registering rights that do not fit the normative conditions of registration often 
unravel (Phuhlisani NPC 2016: 167-171; 127; Kingwill 2014 a & b). 
In a review of the HLP report Manona and Kingwill caution that:  
It is critically important that land administration is not reduced to land recordal. The 
general conditions that give rise to and sustain unregistered and unrecorded rights 
will not vanish in the short and medium term even if a land recordal system is 
introduced. This is a complex and nuanced issue requiring engagement with 
       
62 
 
customary and social systems of tenure recognition that rely on unwritten codes of 
social behaviour with regard to transmission of tenure rights among and within 
extended family systems. (Manona and Kingwill 2019: 8) 
The reviewers emphasise “the need to develop a range of institutions, including adjudication and 
conflict resolution institutions to ensure that the introduction of a land records system provides a 
backbone for recognising rights, but does not result in invalidating rights that remain protected but 
unrecorded” (Ibid: 9).  
7.2 Key tenure findings and proposals of the Presidential Advisory Panel 
The Expert Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (2019) identifies tenure insecurity as a key 
factor exacerbating overall inequalities in land and contributing to the economic exclusion of the 
majority of South Africans with a particular focus on women and youth. The report highlights the 
dualistic agricultural economy in which established white commercial farmers are able to collateralise 
their land to obtain access to finance and farmer support, while the tenure insecurity of black 
smallholders remains an obstacle to finance, support and markets. 
The report proposes support for a mixed tenure model which accommodates a continuum of land rights 
from freehold and communal and which enables multilevel ownership arrangements. It argues that 
freehold and communal systems should not be regarded as polar opposites to each other and challenges 
the assumption that freehold is the only form of tenure which will enable capital investment in land and 
trigger productive growth. 
The report argues that land tenure reform has an important contribution to make in realising 
meaningful land reform in South Africa (Expert Advisory Panel: 45) The panel original principles set out 
in the White Paper of 1997 to underpin tenure reform:  
(a) Tenure reform must move towards rights and away from permits so that rights to 
land are legally enforceable.  
(b) Tenure reform must build a unitary non-racial system of land rights for all South 
Africans, with a system of land registration, support, and administration which 
accommodates flexible and diverse systems of land rights within a unitary 
framework.  
(c) Tenure reform must allow people to choose the tenure system which is 
appropriate to their circumstances.  
(d) All tenure systems must be consistent with the Constitution’s commitment to 
basic human rights and equality, and group-based tenure systems must deliver the 
rights of equality and due process to their members.  
(e) In order to deliver security of tenure, a rights-based approach must be adopted 
The panel proposes a dedicated focus on land administration which it argues should be the fourth pillar 
of land reform. It recommends a separate tenure reform budget line be created, as already exists for 
restitution, so that support for land rights recordal, registration and administration is ring-fenced (Expert 
Advisory Panel: 87). 
The report finds that “land reform in South Africa has yielded little success in establishing a new 
generation of sustainable household, small-scale and commercial black farmers”. The reason cited 
include “the absence of security of tenure and a lack of transfer of title deeds on the acquired portions 
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of land to beneficiaries and poor post settlement support … At the heart of the problem is the poor 
capability of the state which is characterised by deficient coordination, limited and misaligned allocated 
resources… and further complicated by corruption” (Ibid: 11) 
The panel foregrounds poor land administration which exacerbates the problems of tenure contributing 
to economic exclusion. The report records that “despite constitutional provisions, tenure insecurity 
remains a pervasive occurrence. People living in informal settlements, backyard shacks”, in inner city 
buildings, on commercial farms and in communal areas face challenges due to weak, informal and un-
registrable tenure rights in law and in practice, due to governance failures” (Ibid: 12) 
The report identifies “severe problems with the leasehold model in redistribution. In terms of the state 
land lease and disposal policy of 2013 these are meant to be 30-year leases, which lessees are meant to 
pay 5% of net annual turnover as rent. Beneficiaries are typically afforded conditional use rights, and in 
many cases do not have recorded rights – which means that even in cases where the state has bought 
land it has failed to redistribute land rights” (Ibid: 12) 
The panel notes that “although the constitutional court judgements have affirmed and elevate the 
importance of giving voice to communities with insecure tenure rights, Parliament has failed to give 
comprehensive and permanent protection to land insecure communities”. The report notes that farm 
dwellers and labour tenants remain “the poor relation within land policy…and face continuing threats of 
eviction”. The panel urges Parliament to use its powers to “reform the current property law system in 
order to make, legally recognisable and registrable land rights” a reality for the black majority (Ibid: 30). 
According to the panel, women constitute only 23% of the land reform programme beneficiaries (p 33). 
Panellists highlight “the imperative to give ample voice to rural women noting that traditional leaders, 
entrusted to take care of their communities are seen, in general is hampering rather than serving or 
protecting women and their rights” (p. 40). The panel notes that five laws affecting communal land 
tenure and governance including the Traditional and Khoisan Leadership Bill, the Traditional Leadership 
Governance Framework Amendment Bill, the Indigenous Knowledge Bill, the Communal Property 
Associations Amendment Bill and the Traditional Courts Bill “are inconsistent with one another, 
irrational and possibly unconstitutional” (pp. 97-98). With regard to the Ingonyama trust the panel 
states that this “has unilaterally assumed the role of a landowner by converting the people’s Permission 
to Occupy certificates (PTOs) to leases and charging them escalating rentals for occupying the same land 
on which they had lived for many generations” (Ibid: 43). 
The report draws attention to acute urban insecurity of tenure noting that “approximately 80% of the 
South African population in urban areas have off register rights, or no rights to land tenure that are 
recognised in law”. (p. 35) However the panel cautions that “titling, on its own, has also not been proven 
to ‘be the be all and end all’ especially in societies where customary and communal forms of tenure 
particularly pervasive” (Ibid: 42).  
The panel identifies the need for special interventions to support household and smallholder farmers to 
improve rural and urban incomes. It encourages preferential procurement by the state in the food 
sector so as to support access to markets by household and small-scale farmers and community 
enterprises. Targeted sectors should in school should include school feeding schemes, prisons, hospitals 
and the defence sector (Ibid: 85). 
The panel makes important recommendations on budget allocations for land reform. It proposes that 
“the majority portion of the available budget for land reform be focused on two categories – (a) farm 
dwellers, labour tenants and subsistence farmers, and (b) smallholder farmers producing for local 
markets”. The report emphasises that “the state should prioritise smallholders, especially smallholders 
       
64 
 
who produce for their own basic livelihood needs and those who produce partly or wholly for markets, 
including informal markets. They will be the primary focus of the available state resources” (P. 96) while 
the remainder of state funds can be directed to medium- and large-scale commercial farmers, who are 
better situated to contribute their own capital and leverage finance from the Land Bank, commercial 
banks and other financing institutions”. (Ibid: 94) 
The panel calls on the President to assent to the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 64 of 1998 and sign 
it into law forthwith. “Further, the President should explicitly call on all organs of state to work together 
to expedite subdivisions of agricultural and non-agricultural land to make available smallholdings for 
poor people, for residential, business and productive processes. Subdivision of large holdings, for the 
purposes of land reform, is essential if it is to benefit the poor and contribute to a less concentrate and 
unequal pattern of landholding” (Ibid: 95). 
7.3 Effectiveness of proposals for smallholder farmers 
At present it is too early to speculate on the uptake of the recommendations of the HLP and the 
Presidential Advisory Panel. At the time of writing it was reported that government had assented to 60 
of the total of 73 recommendations made by the Presidential Advisory Panel. However exactly what this 
implies remains to be seen. There is a large gap between in-principle support for a proposal and 
concrete steps to ensure its implementation. The practical uptake of the proposals will be an important 
area for ongoing monitoring by small-scale producers, researchers and land activists. 
8 Assessing institutional capacity requirements for effective land tenure reform and effective 
land administration 
8.1 The land administration status quo4 
The present system of land rights management comprise institutions inherited from the previous regime 
that configure the legal powers over property in a steeply hierarchical structure. At the apex is a system 
of legal recognition of ‘ownership’, which in the past was largely restricted to whites, and a range of 
other tenures with lesser legal status applying to the majority of South Africans. Ownership (which is 
legally defined as registered rights held in the Deeds Registry) centres on the cadastral system of 
surveying and registration. In the past this system was structured to recognise ownership along racial 
lines, since black people were generally denied legal ownership, and held mostly unregistered rights that 
were outside the cadastre.  
The cadastral system that links a formally surveyed parcel of land to an identifiable owner (whether one 
or more persons) registered in the Deeds office is the defining feature of the formal property system in 
most countries, and its significance is central to any reform. This system circumscribes the relationship 
of the spatial to social unit as a one-to-one relationship that seldom matches the many-to-many 
relationships that characterise the social systems that are practiced among rights holders who are 
defined outside of the cadastral system.  
Post-apartheid policy makers attempted to solve this inequitable structure of rights recognition in two 
ways:  
• The deracialisation of land law in South Africa, by opening up registration to all South Africans. 
This necessitated formal surveying and registration to register rights.  
 
4 This section draws extensively from a Phuhlisani NPC report prepared for the Open Society in partnership with PLAAS 
authored by Manona and Kingwill (2019) 
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• The extension of protection over existing rights regardless of registrability.  
A series of legislative changes were introduced during the 1990s, using both approaches separately or 
combined. Moves to deracialise land law predated the transition to democratic government in 1994. 
These laws are still on the statute books, principally the Upgrading of Land Rights Act 112 of 1991 and 
the Land Titles Adjustment Act 111 of 1993. Legislation post-1994 sought to give effect to Section 25(6) 
of the Constitution to extend tenure security to all. A range of laws were enacted to apply to various 
categories of land tenure as listed in the Introduction above. 
Three decades later we see that the hierarchy of rights has endured, though in a less racialised form. 
This suggests that the two approaches discussed above have not addressed the root of the problem. 
Although the rights outside of the formal system are no longer determined by race, they do coincide to 
some degree with racial identities and norms, and to a large extent, poverty. The system of registration 
still defines formal property rights and no serious attempt has been made to record the majority of off-
register rights that are managed according to a range of social norms. These systems are best 
understood as ‘social tenures’ due to their socially responsive nature which are socially regulated by 
local norms rather than statutory rules.  
Such rights are managed, usually locally or in families, according to norms and practices that differ from 
the regulatory framework of the Deeds Registry. For example, in many rural and urban contexts, 
properties are regarded as ‘family property’. Families regard themselves as ‘belonging’ to land in a way 
that does not identify any particular owner who would then have proprietary powers of alienation. 
However, the person on the title deeds is legally entitled to sell or subdivide the land. This mismatch 
leads to families not keeping registers up to date as it leads to family conflicts (Kingwill 2014).  Social 
tenures also recognise that different members of a community have access rights to various resources, 
the boundaries of which may change seasonally or to accommodate additional members (Cousins 2008: 
109-137).  
These more flexible social and spatial relationships governing access to, and authority over land are 
odds with the Deeds registry rules that require clearly and accurately defined social and spatial units 
arranged in a one-to-one relationship. To change either of the two systems would be so fundamental as 
to change their very nature. Evidence has revealed that embedded social practices continue even after 
titles are issued, which renders the details on the title deeds inaccurate. The match between the 
information on the title deed and rights recognised on the ground widens further with the passage of 
time (Kingwill 2014 a, b, 2017). 
8.2 Towards a recordal and land administration system that embodies legal and normative pluralism 
There are no state institutions to record, administer, regulate, value and enforce rights, nor solve 
disputes and conflicts that arise across the landscape. Currently the only way to settle land disputes and 
clarify rights is to approach the courts on the basis of Roman Dutch law. There are traditional courts 
ostensibly employing customary law, but these are rejected by many as authoritarian and gender 
unresponsive. Kingwill and Manona (2019) argue that the only sustainable solution is to develop land 
administration institutions and systems which are rooted in legal and normative pluralism and which can 
accommodate diverse systems of rights management.  
These systems have to articulate through a unified and integrated land administration system. In the 
absence of unified property law, protected rights require inclusive land information systems, data 
management, tenure and planning frameworks backed by solid administrative support. These must 
enable the enforcement of rights in different multiple settings while also providing benefits through 
state land administration systems. Such benefits include provision of universal addresses utilising the 
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What3Words system or equivalent, access to improved services, mediation and conflict resolution 
institutions, etc.   
To be sustainable a land rights recordal system would need to be: 
• decentralised at the point of recordal and maintenance; 
• governed by sets of principles that accommodate local practices, rather than uniform rules;  
• configured to accommodate a greater range of social and spatial variables than a title deed in 
order to accommodate access and succession by wider kin, such that no individual is defined as 
the sole ‘owner’ with powers to subdivide, sell, testate to heirs, etc, unless agreed in terms of 
family protocols; 
• subject to institutions designed to mediate and resolve conflicts at local levels; 
• recorded and updated locally which requires local capacity to record and update rights; 
• recognised within a national system of land administration which includes the alignment of 
other elements of land administration, such as inheritance, planning, valuation and taxation.  
While this is the desired trajectory it is clear that South Africa has a very long to go to even begin to 
transform the existing property rights, tenure security and land administrative systems. So, our task is 
the try to conceptualise what could be done in the short to medium term which would strengthen 
tenure security across the landscape and how this would give visibility and incentives to grow 
employment intensive smallholder production in varied rural and urban settings.  
9 Enabling employment intensive land reform 
The question remains as to what extent tenure insecurity and the predominance of off-register rights 
constrain the development of smallholder production and by association the potential for employment 
intensive land reform? To what extent do the constraints facing smallholders lie in tenure insecurity? 
How will increased security of tenure contribute to an expanded smallholder sector? How significant is 
tenure insecurity as a factor constraining smallholder development when measured against the 
structural economic factors at the heart of processes of “adverse incorporation and its consequences for 
landless people, small farmer and farm workers”(Du Toit 2009). 
Mtero is clear about the limitations of the neo classical evolutional theory of land rights which privileges 
titling and land registration:  
Efforts to introduce formalisation of property rights as part of modernising 
indigenous forms of ownership and agriculture in general have not yielded the 
desired results. In most instances, formalisation of property rights has resulted in the 
obliteration of overlapping and multiple rights to land characteristic of customary 
forms of tenure. The failure of land titling and registration programmes implemented 
by various national governments with the aid of various multilateral organisations 
and donor agencies is widely documented.(2016 n.p) 
The fundamentals of this approach to formalise land rights prioritise land registration as a means to: 
• stimulate more efficient land-use, by increasing tenure security and providing incentives to 
invest in the longer-term management and productivity of the land; 
• reduce transaction costs and enables the creation of a land market, allowing land transfers from 
less to more dynamic farmers and its consolidation into larger holdings. In urban areas, it 
enables a formal market for land and housing that helps to increase supply and reduce prices;  
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• provide farmers with a title that can be offered as collateral to banks, improving farmers’ access 
to credit, and allowing them to invest in land improvements. In urban areas, land registration 
also allows owners to use land as collateral for loans and safeguards their investment in 
housing; 
• provide governments with information on land-holders and size of plots, i.e. the foundation for 
a property tax system (Bromley 2009).  
Mtero cites the findings of a recent systematic review (Lawry, Samii et al. 2017) which analysed both 
quantitative and qualitative studies to ascertain the impact of land property rights interventions on 
investment and agricultural productivity in developing countries. The systematic review concluded that 
there was no strong, direct causal link between tenure rights recognition and productivity, as well as 
income gains. It was noted that tenure rights recognition may contribute to productivity and increasing 
farm incomes, partly as a result of increased perceptions of tenure security and investments. Yet not all 
productivity and income gains may be attributed to the recognition of tenure rights. 
So, in the South African setting we need to distinguish between:  
• land registration agendas as part of a narrow agenda to promote individual titling; 
• land recordal and administration systems which form part of a broader socioeconomic rights 
initiative to:  
o secure and make transparent existing rights in land,  
o enable family tenure,  
o and assist vulnerable rightsholders whose property is off-register to protect their 
livelihood assets against arbitrary dispossession.  
9.1 Recommendations for tenure reform and land administration  
The table below highlights what needs to change to create tenure and land administration regimes 
which assist in securing accesses and registrable rights in land backed by systems of land administration 
which could contribute to developing an enabling environment for smallholder production in different 
settings. 
Table 5: Recommendations for tenure reform and land administration 
Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
Former bantustans Adopt the HLP recommendations to pass 
the Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 
to  
recognise beneficial occupation of land 
protect informal rights to land which are 
often shared and overlapping and 
governed by living customary law  
ensure that no person’s informal right to 
occupy land may be deprived without 
their consent 
protect those whose rights are off register 
and vulnerable paying particular attention 
to the land rights of women 
Train and resource independent 
facilitators to conduct land rights 
enquiries and facilitate democratic 
decision making  
Provide a public data base of all 
certificates of consent enabling 
deprivation of land rights approved in 
terms of PILRA to provide oversight over 
land deals 
Identify all the remaining paper-based 
PTO and quitrent land records in the 
former homelands, collate and digitise 
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Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
enable compensation for those deprived 
of informal rights in land 
 
Rethink basic requirements for cadastral 
information and rights  
recordal in different settings across the 
continuum of land rights with special 
attention to communal tenure settings 
Pilot low cost, ‘good enough’ options to 
repurpose the cadastral and land records 
system to enable adequate description 
and registration of land rights in different 
settings across the continuum of land 
rights. 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
Develop institutional options for land 
rights recordal linked to spatial 
development planning and revenue 
collection at local municipal and district 
scales 
Specify the role and functions of 
traditional councils and land holding 
entities in local land administration, 
allocate budget and support capacity for 
this function 
Develop checks and balances that prevent 
corrupt and improper transactions in the 
land registry and dispossession of 
vulnerable rights holders 
Ingonyama Trust Implement HLP and PAP 
recommendations to fundamentally 
amend or repeal ITA 
Protect the rights of people living on land 
administered by ITA against arbitrary 
deprivation and conversion to leasehold 
with a particular focus on the rights of 
women 
Refund lease payments levied by ITA  
Act 9/TRANCRAA 
Rural Areas 
Implement HLP and PAP 
recommendations to revitalise TRANCRAA 
process 
Clarify land rights and resolve disputes  
Clarify and support role of local 
municipality or communal property 
Association holding TRANCRAA land in the 
process of land rights recordal, 





Clarify and support role of local 
municipality or landholding entity holding 
restored land in the process of land rights 
recordal, management of local registers 
and rights transfers 
Develop and update registers of members 
and clarify individual rights in land – 
(residential sites, business sites in 
established settlements, grazing and 
arable rights. 
Clarify entry and exit procedures for 
membership 
Clarify member eligibility for a share of 
benefits from business enterprises that 
may be operated from the property 
Pilot low cost, ‘good enough’ options to 
repurpose the cadastral and land records 
system to enable adequate description 
and registration of land rights in different 
settings across the continuum of land 
rights. 
Develop processes and procedures for 
internal subdivision and the allocation of 
rights on subdivided land 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
Budget for, develop capacity and provide 
support for land rights administration by 
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Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
Clarify member’s responsibilities to 
contribute to a pro rata portion of the 
property rates levied on the land, 
together with other membership and 
service fees 
Clarify the liability of members for debts 
which may be incurred by the Association 
CPAs including an updated register of 
members and the allocation of land use 
rights 
 
Land transferred to 




Commission a research to review the 
status and sustainability of properties 
transferred through SLAG 
Agree responsibilities, procedures and 
assign capacity to wind up/liquidate failed 
projects and deregister defunct legal 
entities  
Develop procedures for subdivision of 
land and reallocation of rights on an 
ownership or leasehold basis  
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes 
Include areas targeted for the creation of 
smallholdings within municipal spatial 
development frameworks 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 




Commission a research to review the 
status and sustainability of properties 
transferred through LRAD.  
Document and share lessons for land 
reform and land tenure  
Agree responsibilities, procedures and 
assign capacity to wind up/liquidate failed 
projects and deregister defunct legal 
entities where required 
Develop procedures for subdivision of 
land and reallocation of rights on an 
ownership or leasehold basis as may be 
appropriate 
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes where appropriate 
Consider Act to enable retrospective 
endorsement of the title deeds of all land 
purchased through the land reform 
programme to give the state the right of 
first refusal to purchase land which comes 




Review the status quo with leases on 2200 
farms purchased through this programme  
Revisit the State Land lease and Disposal 
Policy to review lease terms and options 
to own state land acquired through PLAS.  
Develop clear criteria for the allocation of 
farms in terms of this programme 
consistent with the principles in the 
proposed Land Reform Framework Act 
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes 
Include areas targeted for the creation of 
smallholdings within municipal spatial 
development frameworks 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
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Tenure setting Tenure reform recommendations Land administration recommendations 
Farm workers and 
dwellers 
Develop a clear policy framework to guide 
the implementation of section 4 of ESTA 
Incentivise policy options which give 
access to land to farm workers and 
dwellers for cultivation and grazing by 
agreement with the landowner. 
Review policy for on and off-site 
settlement and make available tenure 
grants and dwellers to acquire land for 
housing and small-scale production 
Analyse the feasibility of delivering 
services to off-site settlements and the 
danger of creating rural poverty traps 
Review and revise existing policy on 
farmworker housing and assess the 
appropriateness of the Operation Phakisa 
proposals on the creation of ‘smart’ 
agrivillages. 
Develop policy and feasibility criteria for 
the establishment of rural agrivillages and 
hamlets. 
Labour tenants Appoint a Special Master 
Reconstruct the register of labour tenant 
claims 
Process claims 
Create clear guidelines for consultation 
around tenure arrangements on restored 
land and potential for subdivision of 
properties between different labour 
tenant families with pre-existing rights to 
the land 
Develop policy guidelines and procedures 
for subdivision and the creation of 
smallholdings appropriate for different 
land capability classes 
Include areas targeted for the creation of 
smallholdings within municipal spatial 
development frameworks 
Adapt spatial and land tenure information 
systems to recognise social tenures and 
fuzzy/dynamic boundaries while ensuring 
gender equity with respect to land and 
property rights 
Commonage users Review the status quo with management 
and leases on municipal commonage 
purchased through this programme  
Revisit the commonage policy to review 
lease terms and the determination of user 
fees and responsibilities  
Develop clear criteria for the allocation of 
commonage use rights consistent with the 
principles in the proposed Land Reform 
Framework Act 
Develop a register of municipal 
commonage land held by local and district 
municipalities 
 
Of course, the key residual question is who will take responsibility to address these various complex and 
often contested issues and where does the capacity lie to systematically address recommendations of 
such a wide-ranging nature? Currently there is no obvious answer as the trajectory taken by the state, 
particularly with respect to the rights of 18 million rural citizens suggest that policy and law are moving 
in the opposite direction to the thrust of what is recommended here. 




This paper has attempted to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of different landholding 
and tenure scenarios found across the landscape in South Africa. As the paper has demonstrated these 
scenarios are highly diverse and require customised and localised approaches to find solutions.  Tenure 
security can be conceptualised both as a defence and as an opportunity.  
Many of the recommendations and legislative measures proposed by national enquiries and panels are 
primarily defensive in nature – recognising that poor and vulnerable households are at risk of 
dispossession or having their rights diluted without their informed consent.  
The link between tenure security and a new approach to employment intensive land reform which aims 
to revitalise economic and livelihood potential in underutilised land or land acquired through the land 
reform programme remains less clear. It has been strongly argued that tenure security cannot be 
reduced to land rights recordal, but must be grounded new user-friendly systems of land administration 
and the development of institutions that enable citizens to make more effective use of their land rights 
and realise its distributive and productive potential. 
However, by themselves such measures are unlikely to be sufficient to overcome the deep structural 
impediments shaping the contemporary agrarian economy. Clearly it will require much more than 
security of tenure to reinvigorate land-based livelihoods in South Africa. While secure land rights provide 
an essential foundation for economic and livelihood opportunities, such rights also confer obligations. 
They make land rights holders visible to the state and to the payment of rates and taxes. In ‘grouphold’ 
contexts created by land reform recorded rights for households and individuals will come with 
responsibilities to contribute to the maintenance and upkeep of common property and shared 
infrastructure. The increase in overhead costs and related obligations associated with recorded and 
legally secure rights risks being unpalatable to poor and marginal households who may perceive an 
imbalance between costs and benefits and who would prefer accordingly to manage the risks and 
exploit the opportunities associated with informality and continued invisibility to the state. It will be 
crucial therefore to find a favourable balance between costs, responsibilities and tangible enhancement 
of opportunities and benefits.
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